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ABSTRACT 
The aporia of the Anthropocene asks: how can we begin to conceptualise that which remains 
beyond all human conception, and in addition, how can we as individual agents act in mind of 
this inconceivable other? The network of events given the blanket designation of the 
environmental crisis marks a point at which ungrounded, complex systems impinge on all 
terrestrial lifeforms. Like a ghost, the by-products of past actions return as the alterity of the 
more-than-human erupts into our very human ethical frameworks. To the subject, as enclosed in 
the scope of an individual perspective, these disjointed systems of cause and effect manifest as 
a spectre - the trace of non-presence that, although essentially immeasurable, has a deciding 
influence over all present reality. Therefore, I approach the aporia of the Anthropocene through 
Derrida’s hauntology as an ethical system that opens closed ontologies to their constitutive 
outside, deconstructing a metaphysics of presence through rejecting the primacy of here-now 
existences, resisting unfolding the other as a being in terms of the self. The value of such an 
ethics to ecology is evident in that a hauntological understanding remains marginal to the 
modes of knowledge through which notions of non-relational being, anthropocentrism or 
exploiter-exploited dynamics are maintained. To think an entangled living-together is not to 
come to terms with the existence of the other, but to, in thinking it, take responsibility for the 
other ​as ​other, ultimately recognising its formative non-presence in the structures of embodied, 
present, here-now realities.  
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2 
A SPECTRE IS HAUNTING ... 
 
A spectre is haunting the world - the spectre of the Anthropocene.​ An analogy with as many 
ironies as invocations, but what happens if these are taken seriously? If we do in fact “follow the 
ghost”? There are many variations on this general statement: a spectre is haunting humanity, 
art, academia; the spectre of climate change, extinction, reality itself - events or figures 
overshadowing contemporary landscapes: dispersed through the virtual landscapes of media in 
the symbols comprising the contemporary cultural imaginary, and of course looming in a very 
literal sense over the landscapes of the planet itself.   1
Describing the situation around the turn of the millennium Jeffrey Andrew Weinstock 
writes: ‘Our contemporary moment is a haunted one’.  Along with various other depictions of 2
phantasmal entities in contemporary media, literature and theatre, it was around this time, 
following the 1993 publication of Jacques Derrida’s ​Specters of Marx, ​that the so-called 
“spectral turn” in academia, and specifically in poststructuralist literary and cultural theory, was 
gaining momentum. The ghost provided critics with a new conceptual metaphor by which to 
reveal narratives that had been repressed, excluded or otherwise obscured in the dominant 
discourse, acting as a sort of recapitulation as well as development of Derrida’s wider 
1 ‘A spectre is haunting the entire world: but it is not that of communism.... Climate change – no more, no 
less than nature’s payback for what we are doing to our precious planet – is day by day now revealing 
itself’: Mark Levene, ‘Rescue! History – A Manifesto for the Humanities in the Age of Climate Change – 
An Appeal for Collaborators’ on http://www.rescue-history.org.uk (2005) 
 ‘The spectre of the Anthropocene is haunting the world’: Josef Barla, ‘Anthropocene’ on 
https://newmaterialism.eu 
‘A specter is haunting academia—the specter of the Anthropocene’: JR McNeill, ‘Introductory Remarks: 
The Anthropocene and the Eighteenth Century’ in ​Eighteenth-Century Studies​ (Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 2016) p.117 
‘A spectre is haunting humanity: That spectre is reality itself, a reality that supersedes, trumps, and 
outwits all our ideas about it’: Adrian Ivakhiv, ​Shadowing the Anthropocene: Eco-realism for Turbulent 
Times ​(punctum books, 2018) 
2 Jeffrey Andrew Weinstock, ‘from Introduction: The Spectral Turn’ in ​The Spectralities Reader: Ghosts 
and Haunting in Contemporary Cultural Theory,​ ed. María del Pilar Blanco, Esther Peeren (London: 
Bloomsbury, 2013) p.61 
3 
deconstructive project. Now, nearly two decades on, we find that although the popularity of the 
ghost may have plateaued somewhat, the historical conditions for its resurgence - the changing 
nature of international relations, conflict and security, the virulent spread of neoliberalism, the 
increasingly non-present, immaterial nature of the media: the ‘disruptions and dislocations in the 
human world’ described by Derrida as the ‘happening’ of deconstruction; ‘crises, wars, 
phenomena of so-called national and international terrorism, massacres that are declared or 
not, the transformation of the global market and of international law’ - have only intensified.  3
While the spectre may not be such a ubiquitous figure in contemporary theory, its presence has 
hardly been exorcised. However, the ‘emergent unreadability’ of the ecological situation 
signified by the Anthropocene opens spectral frequencies by way of an ethical injunction whose 
urgency remains unparalleled in recent history.  A spectral liminality, existing somewhere 4
between presence and absence, being and non-being - a ​non-present presence -​ characterises 
our perception of the environmental crisis, as increasingly incomprehensible systems impinge 
directly on the existence of all forms of terrestrial life. The severity of this situation forces us to 
reconcile with this other in ways that dismantle the metaphysical conditions from which we are 
able to do so, a reconception of our terrestrial existence as an entangled living-together. The 
ethics of this encounter - for any encounter with an other it is, at its core, an ethical one - carries 
a weight immediate to all human actors, yet simultaneously, paradoxically, the inconceivability 
of the environmental crisis strips the individual of any sense of agency, responsibility or 
accountability. Therefore we must accommodate multiple, contradictory modes of thought, 
holding that which remains utterly inaccessible as integral to our ethical frameworks as that 
which constitutes our embodied experience. 
3 Timothy Clark, ‘Some Climate Change Ironies: Deconstruction, Environmental Politics and the Closure 
of Ecocriticism’ in ​The Oxford Literary Review 32.1 ​(Edinburgh University Press, 2010) pp.134-135 
4 Timothy Clark, ​Ecocriticism on the Edge ​(London: Bloomsbury, 2015) 
4 
First, what is haunting? In Ken McMullen’s 1983 film ​Ghost Dance, ​Pascale Ogier asks 
Jacques Derrida, arguably the most prominent late 20th century philosopher of the spectral, 
‘[d]o you believe in ghosts?’.  One could infer from his response, aware of the manner and 5
medium in which he is to be portrayed - or being portrayed, to us, from the perspective of our 
own present moment - that it is in fact the kinds of existence opened through this medium - 
cinema or telecommunication devices in general, that reveal spectral existences, as something 
necessarily fluid, inaccessible and essentially paradoxical, in the most tangible ways. At a time 
in which Derrida himself is absent, the body of the man, even in death, as is the case today, he 
speaks to us from somewhere else, from beyond the grave, through this simulacrum. In 
appearing as himself he is letting a ghost ‘ventriloquise’ his words, since the improvisational 
nature of the scene means they exist entirely in a state of displacement.  They are removed 6
from the embodied moment in which they are first spoken and preserved in the moving image, 
only to return at another time and in an alternative material state to that in which they were first 
conceived. If these words were formulated beforehand he would not be letting a ghost speak for 
him in such an absolute way, since he would in a sense be speaking on behalf of a ghost 
already. In the moment of their being spoken the words would remain always partially ahead or 
behind of their instance, channeled through various points in time from elsewhere, with each 
coordinate forming its own ghosts, containing its own hauntings. This is in fact the case with the 
closing statement of his improvisation, the only line that was dictated to him by the filmmaker: 
‘and what about you … Do you believe in ghosts?’.  Derrida ventriloquises the words of the 7
director, the non-present presence haunting the statement from the past, while Derrida the 
ventriloquist is haunted by the promise of his own non-presence from the future; coordinates 
5 ​Ghost Dance​ [DVD] dir. Ken McMullen (London: Channel Four Films​, ​1983) 
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid. 
5 
which are then ventriloquised once more to us, displaced from this lived moment, returning 
through the televisual simulacrum. Conceived and spoken simultaneously the words manifest as 
an entirely physical gesture, meaning that when we watch ​Ghost Dance ​we are presented only 
with the displacement of this physicality: an impression of bodily presence that returns ‘but 
slightly with-held’, giving us a glimpse not only of that which is brought back, the idea of 
presence preserved in this partial form, but also that which is lost.  As Avery Gordon writes, the 8
ghost is therefore ‘one form by which something lost, or barely visible, or seemingly not there to 
our supposedly well-trained eyes, makes itself known or apparent to us’.  The ​revenant ​is not 9
the return of the thing of which it acts as a simulacrum, the lost or departed, but the return of the 
very displacement of this thing, of that which grounded the thing as itself in a particular order, 
whether in a sense of physical materiality or something more ephemeral.  
Spectrality therefore describes a state of anachrony: ‘The disjointure in the very 
presence of the present, this sort of non-contemporaneity of present time with itself’, meaning 
the spectre is that which remains always ‘outside itself’, ‘out of sync’ with conventional temporal 
and spatial orders; a quasi-material, quasi-ontological, quasi-transcendental non-presence that, 
through an interruption of linear time, dislocates the idea of presence - as necessarily spatial 
and temporal, the spatiotemporal here-now - as we know it.  Spectral existences unground 1011
the measured, quantifiable point of the spatialised or temporalised to the immeasurable, 
unspecified flow of spacing and temporisation in which the lived present is disjointed - a 
space-time beyond all immediate quantifiability. 
8 Nick Mansfield, ‘There is a Spectre Haunting...’: Ghosts, Their Bodies, Some Philosophers, a Novel and 
the Cultural Politics of Climate Change’ in ​Borderlands, 7, 1,​ (2008) 
(http://www.borderlands.net.au/vol7no1_2008/mansfield_climate.htm) 
9 Avery Gordon, quoted in Weinstock, ‘from Introduction: The Spectral Turn’ in ​The Spectralities Reader: 
Ghosts and Haunting in Contemporary Cultural Theory, ​p.64 
10 Jacques Derrida, Bernard Stiegler, ‘Spectrographies’ in ​The Spectralities Reader: Ghosts and Haunting 
in Contemporary Cultural Theory,​ p.40 
11 Jacques Derrida, ​Specters of Marx ​(London: Routledge, 2006) p.29  
6 
This means that in the anachrony of haunting physical space as something bounded by 
defined temporal coordinates becomes disrupted, lost, left behind, manifesting, materialising 
immaterially, somewhere outside or beyond any metaphysical system that gives precedence to 
the here-now. Bernard Stiegler, in another interview with Derrida​,​ refers to a passage in Roland 
Barthes’ ​Camera Lucida, ​a consideration of photography​ ​that illuminates this non-presence of 
the ​revenant ​brought back through the televisual image: ​‘in photography, I can never deny that 
the thing was there. Past and reality are superimposed …. The photo is literally an emanation of 
the referent. From a real body which was there proceed radiations that come to touch me, I who 
am here. [...] A kind of umbilical cord ties the body of the photographic thing to my gaze’.  ​In an 12
image evoking the life cycle itself, the passage from cradle to grave, the umbilical cord that 
connects the body of the present viewer of the photograph to the non-body of the photograph’s 
non-present referent drags past and future virtualities into the here-now. There is a kind of 
presence here, but it remains inaccessible, withdrawn into the unspecified beyond. Stiegler 
continues, noting that in response to this Derrida had written: ‘the modern possibility of the 
photograph joins, in a single system, death and the referent’.  Death is that which is beyond us 13
present beings in the most absolute sense, meaning the photograph, as a means of 
communication in the same vein as the moving image or the written word, opens up a timescale 
that is always somewhere ahead of us. This brings me to one of the central points from 
Derrida’s dialogue in ​Ghost Dance: ​that ‘the future belongs to ghosts’.  In that it is ‘reproducible 14
in our absence’, the photograph introduces the possibility of our very own disappearance.  As 15
soon as some trace essence of that which we consider “us” is preserved in different 
material-temporal conditions from our own linear birth-death trajectory, we are haunted by the 
12 Roland Barthes, quoted in Derrida, Stiegler, ‘Spectrographies’ p. 37 
13 Derrida, Stiegler, Ibid. p.38 
14 ​Ghost Dance 
15 Derrida, Stiegler, ‘Spectrographies’ p.38 
7 
non-presence promised by this timescale beyond our own. From outside any embodied 
chronology or dimension, this thing speaks to us. Not ​as ​us, since the interior notion of “us”, the 
subject of self-reference, is always defined by way of an embodied spatiotemporality. Rather, 
this thing speaks ​without ​us, it ventriloquises us, appearing from an outside that remains 
incomprehensible from the immanent conditions of the present moment; an existence defined 
along a scale limited by the coordinates of life and death.  
We can therefore say that haunting describes a situation of spatiotemporal 
indeterminacy. Not the invasion or imposition of the here-now by that which lies outside so 
much as a realisation of its formative openness to this outside; its irrevocable entanglements 
with that which has been and that which is to come. This conflation entails the disintegration of 
the here-now as a generalised position in the synchronic order of ‘present-past, 
‘present-present’, ‘present-future’, rejecting the notion of the bounded present as a fixed point in 
a chain of linear succession.  The instance of the present is always relayed through past and 16
future dimensions, but this structure cannot be properly integrated in the embodied boundaries 
of the subject. Something is always lost, excluded, repressed - spectralised, you could say - by 
these lived timescales, yet the trace of this displaced other always remains, returning once 
again. Haunting is therefore characteristic of phenomenal time: 
 
‘If there is something like spectrality, there are reasons to doubt this reassuring order of 
presents and, especially, the border between the present, the actual or present reality of 
the present, and everything that can be opposed to it: absence, non-presence, 
non-effectivity, inactuality, virtuality, or even the simulacrum in general’.  17
 
16 Derrida, ​Spectres of Marx, ​p.48 
17 Ibid. 
8 
Like the linguistic sign, the incompleteness of any context, determined by the trace of that which 
it is not, the present moment is formed within a network of relations that can be easily obscured 
by the presupposition of a singular, linear model of temporality. This means, if we accept the 
openness of the here-now to that which lies outside, we see that it is actually constituted 
through its relations with extraneous there-then virtualities. To exclude these relations based on 
notions of inherent virtue, self-identical unity or conceptions of being or time that can only be 
accessed by way of limit and reduction, is to risk falling into the empty presuppositions of 
totalitarian thinking, conceding to the draw of microfascism by segmenting, constricting, 
obscuring or repressing reality through the modes of thought we mobilise to access it. Presence 
can no longer have primacy as the determining factor in our experience of reality for example, 
since it is only through the traces of that which is absolutely other to this experience, an 
inconceivable network of excluded non-presences, that this experience can be structured as 
such. 
The limits of spatiotemporal frameworks such as the myth of progress or the 
anthropocentric time of modernity, along with the kinds of non-relational, atomistic approaches 
to being limited by their particular reductionisms, are revealed as such - ​as​ limits - through the 
inaccessible excess of these ghostly recurrences. Presence as an ontological condition (in 
some cases the condition ​for ​ontology - the “metaphysics of presence” that Derrida seeks to 
disrupt) is ungrounded or displaced as the determining factor of our experience through the 
interruption of the linear temporality along which it is defined. Ghosts are not, at least in theory, 
an entirely inexorable phenomenon in the conditions of reality per se. Rather, they are produced 
through a particular scope of experience. For example, in the classic sense, ghosts appear to us 
because we uphold the linear space-time that moves from birth to death, along which all 
“present” ontological existences are then defined. Therefore, any beings that do not fall within 
9 
these coordinates - beings that are ​‘not,​ no longer or not yet’ present - cannot be considered to 
properly “exist” at all, since existence is only defined in terms of that which can be perceived in 
relation to the space-time of embodied subjectivity.  We can immediately see the hierarchical 18
nature of such a model: these conditions are defined in terms of the subject, meaning all that is 
external (inaccessible or imperceptible) to the subject is subordinated, repressed or erased 
through the establishment of a dichotomy of self and other, interior and exterior, thereby 
allowing for the domination and exploitation of this externalised other as a vacant and passive 
entity. 
As Colin Davis writes, ghosts represent ‘a wholly irrecuperable intrusion in our world, 
which is not comprehensible within our available intellectual frameworks, but whose otherness 
we are responsible for preserving’.  To claim that these frameworks are inherently totalitarian is 19
not necessarily to implicate the individual through which they operate, but simply to emphasise 
that any such framework, being, as it is, operative through limitation, works through a kind of 
ontological hierarchisation, filtration or exclusion. If we again take the example of the ontological 
categories of presence and non-presence, the figure of the ghost as a critical tool is used to 
highlight and problematise the default placing of one over the other when conceived within a 
particular intellectual framework. However, the inherently limited nature of our embodied 
perception relative to all possible ontological conditions means that such orders are essentially 
unavoidable - ‘the clear demarcation of self and other - is, as Kant suggests elsewhere, not 
simply a mistake, but a misunderstanding about the ​scope ​of a distinction that, up to a point, 
under certain conditions, we cannot avoid making’.  The acknowledgement of these excluded 20
18 Derrida, ​Spectres of Marx, ​p.121 
19 Colin Davis, ‘État Présent: Hauntology, Spectres and Phantoms’ in ​The Spectralities Reader: Ghosts 
and Haunting in Contemporary Cultural Theory, ​p.53 
20 David Wood, ‘Specters of Derrida: On the Way to Econstruction’ in ​Ecospirit: Religions and 
Philosophies for the Earth ​ed. Laurel Kearns, Catherine Keller (NY: Fordham University Press, 2007) 
p.268 
10 
others is therefore an ethical imperative, since the foundation of ethics as based on the 
Derridean notion of a justice-to-come is realised in this out of jointedness of time; the futural 
dimension that determines the lived instance of the temporal event, but that remains always 
beyond it, ahead of it, founded through an encounter with a radical, disembodied alterity. If our 
ethical imperative as acknowledgment is to resist exclusionary tendencies: ‘to learn to live ​with 
ghosts, in the upkeep, the conversation, the company, or the companionship, in the commerce 
without commerce of ghosts. To live otherwise, and better. No, not better, but more justly. But 
with ​them’, we must find ways of thinking that can operate without resorting to generalisation, 
counterposition, limitation, synthesis or hierarchy, remaining always open to the non-present, 
the not here and not now.  We can find this hierarchical thought in, for example, the risky 21
enterprise of the practice of philosophy as a search for truth, and Derrida’s deconstruction - 
along with other poststructuralist projects in a similar vein (Deleuze and Guattari’s, for example) 
- is based around an exit from these modes of thought; in this case through the ‘destabilisation 
or deconstruction of established institutions’, so as to open up ‘the passage toward the other’, to 
do justice to the other as radical alterity, to resist reducing the other to an object of knowledge in 
terms of the self through its refiguration within an established framework.  This encounter with 22
the non-present and non-quantifiable as formative to any present, cohesive understanding of 
reality is founded on the ethical injunction towards or in maintenance of the other that is key to 
Derrida’s notion of haunting. That if we are to open our modes of thought in such a way, to do 
justice to the other as other, we must accept the impossibility of comprehending the other: to 
comprehend it, but incomprehensibly.   23
21 Derrida, ​Specters of Marx, ​pp. xvii-xviii 
22 Paul Patton, ‘Future Politics’ in ​Between Deleuze and Derrida, ​ed. Paul Patton, John Protevi (London: 
Continuum, 2003)​ ​p.16 
23 Derrida, ​Specters of Marx, ​p.10 
11 
When we raise environmental questions the need for an ethics of alterity becomes clear. 
As soon as something is excluded from our frame of reference it is subordinated, cast out as 
something ‘dispensable for our existence’.  However, in the face of crisis this is also not 24
necessarily a call to act in mind of individual entities, but to consider complex, encompassing 
systems of relations that remain to us by their very nature entirely abstract. Timothy Clark 
writes: ‘Climate change seems a happening whose trauma is to enact or entail the 
deconstruction of multiple frames of reference in multiple fields and modes of thought at the 
same time’.  Clark identifies environmental questions as ‘a perplexing and seemingly 25
expanding absence or even evasion in Derrida’s thinking’, and indeed, it would seem that these 
questions manifest as a pervasive, haunting non-presence throughout his project.  I want to 26
intensify these ecological tendencies - think with the ghost, if you will - in accounting for the 
inherent aporia of the Anthropocene as a concept and moment that not only haunts, but is itself 
haunted, existing in an interstitial and multifactorial state of displacement from itself, from its 
intellectual and terrestrial grounds. 
One of the central tenets of the Anthropocene is the troubling of distinctions between 
interior and exterior: of man/nature, here/there, now/then. If we accept the logic of the ghost, we 
see that boundaries between these distinctions are already agitated. The excluded returns once 
again. As soon as we accept a singular, linear model of temporality, for example - the life-death 
trajectory of the individual, the progressive time of modernity, even the generalised chain of 
presents that structures synchronic temporal succession - the ghosts begin to appear, returning 
from the radically elsewhere. Spectres open the lived present to diachronic relations with the 
past, generating a future to come by way of an endless differance, the rupture of the present as 
24 Wood, ‘Specters of Derrida: On the Way to Econstruction’ p.277 
25 Clark, ‘Some Climate Change Ironies: Deconstruction, Environmental Politics and the Closure of 
Ecocriticism’, p.132 
26 Ibid. p.132 
12 
a closed interiority, where we are able to think with, rather than despite, otherness. The 
“closure” of metaphysics is interrupted, decentering the human as the ‘unthematized point of 
departure for all reflection’, countering the myopia of privileging individual, embodied 
anthropocentric spatiotemporal modalities over others; existing as they do in a complex, 
entangled web, in which linear causal relations are delocalised and interdependence is revealed 
as un-immediate and oceanic.  27
The radical alterity of the ghost is not a component or coordinate of the present, part of 
the visible or sensible structures that allow us to perceive reality as a set of lucid experiences, 
but the non-present, incomprehensible other that gives form to these experiences as such. 
Haunting does not simply describe the relational model of time for example, but the 
inaccessible, immaterial and wholly other manifestation of these relations to us, as, 
fundamentally, beings of the here-now. This means haunting is not only a function of spacing 
and temporisation, the unspecified flows upon which defined spatial and temporal coordinates 
are marked, but also woven into the inference of meaning and the processes of thought itself. 
As in Derrida’s formulation of signification in general, one we could typify as entirely based on 
this act of haunting, of being haunted, the haunting of being; meaning is not inherent to the sign 
but always deferred, always determined by the trace of the other within. As Derrida says, in 
response to Ogier’s question: ‘So ghosts do exist… And it’s the ghosts who will answer you. 
Perhaps they already have’.  28
 
 
 
27 Wood, ‘Specters of Derrida: On the Way to Econstruction’, p.274 
28 ​Ghost Dance 
13 
WAITING FOR THE ANTHROPOCENE 
 
A spectre is haunting. ​The statement summons the spirit of Marx that waited for Derrida, the 
phantasmal presence that opens ​The Communist Manifesto.​ In ​Hamlet ​it is the apparition of the 
ghost that sets in motion the events of the play, but the ghost itself does not participate beyond 
its initial appearance, and this absence, or more accurately, this ​absent presence, ​this 
non-presence,​ is of vital importance: ‘As in Hamlet, the Prince of a rotten state, everything 
begins by the apparition of a spectre’.  Only here, perhaps, the rotten state has become the 29
rotten planet - the ruined landscapes of the Anthropocene, animated by the zombified flows of 
capital, revealing the unremitting emergence of an unlife within death; the otherworldly motion of 
the no-longer or not-yet, the opening of embodied human spatiotemporalities to an outside 
beyond the horizons of any human perspective. In all forms it appears, the ghost is a catalysing 
force. Not so much the a priori producer or architect of a connection between otherwise 
separate spatiotemporal positions (past/present, here/there), but an opening through which we 
realise the mutual constitution of these positions by way of their concurrence, existing outside 
any notions of self-identical, interior being, yet upon which all of this existence depends. It does 
not manifest at any one point, a single place or a single time, but in the relational coming into 
being of spatiotemporal positions classically thought to be separated. This means, since 
manifestation in terms of the here-now can only occur within the defined material properties of a 
singular physical or temporal position, the ghost does not properly manifest at all. It exists as a 
superposition: in the concurrence of multiple states or previously irreconcilable points on linear 
(dimensional, chronological) scales, or in the entwining (or re-entwining) of the scales 
themselves (past-present, here-there). In other words, the spectre marks a discontinuity, a 
29 Derrida, ​Spectres of Marx, ​p.2 
14 
rupture in linear time that reveals in its place a ‘polytemporal assemblage’.  For Bruno Latour, 30
this temporal confusion can be read as a symptom of modernity: ‘modern temporality is the 
result of a retraining imposed on entities which would pertain to all sorts of times and possess 
all sorts of ontological statuses without this harsh disciplining’.  As I have said, the ghost or 31
spectre is what emerges when constraints such as the singular, linear, and thoroughly 
anthropocentric temporality of modernity are established, reducing being to binary categories 
and neglecting our deep entanglements with extraneous timescales and the ways of being they 
describe. Modern times pass ‘while eliminating everything in their path’, but in one way or 
another, these excluded modes always return.   32
That which is to come. Everything begins by the apparition of a spectre, and ‘[m]ore 
precisely by the ​waiting ​for this apparition’.  A spectre is haunting Europe, humanity, the world. 33
If the spectre is the trace of the non-present in the present, the trace of presence in 
non-presence, it therefore operates through the deferral of presence as a state of self-identical 
wholeness. This deferral, as well as describing the withdrawal of the term Anthropocene from its 
numerous practical applications (being considered unsuitable, inaccurate, reductionist, 
depoliticising, over-politicising, etc.), agitates our conception of straightforward topography or 
temporality with regards to the genealogy of ideas, interrupting disciplinary boundaries as the 
concept proliferates across various field-specific chronologies. Of course, this is not to say that 
the Anthropocene fails in signifying a set of specific concerns. First proposed by Paul Crutzen 
and Eugene Stroemer, the Anthropocene thesis as understood in geological or biological terms 
is essentially arguing for the status of mankind as a geophysical agency, the impact of which 
30 Bruno Latour, quoted in Roger Luckhurst, ​‘from ​The Contemporary London Gothic and the Limits of the 
‘Spectral Turn’’ in ​The Spectralities Reader: Ghosts and Haunting in Contemporary Cultural Theory, ​p.81 
31 Ibid. 
32 Bruno Latour, ​We Have Never Been Modern​. (MA: Harvard University Press, 1993) p.76 
33 Derrida, ​Spectres of Marx, ​p.2 
15 
can be traced in rock strata or through the accelerated reconfiguration and artificialisation the 
biosphere through anthropocentric systems of urban development and economic growth. The 
effect that human activity has had on the environment is undeniably unprecedented among 
Earth species, and the growing evidence supporting deep and extensive alterations to the 
landscape and climate in favour of industrialisation or petro-capital means that its status as a 
‘charismatic mega-concept’ has extended far beyond its roots in stratigraphy and Earth system 
science.  The term is applied liberally across various fields to address the dynamic of the 34
current ecological situation, as anthropogenic changes destabilise the planet’s bio-geo-chemical 
systems. It is this general condition, an assessment of the human response-ability (to use 
Donna Haraway’s term) to participate in terrestrial assemblages, that is signified by the 
Anthropocene. Not simply the qualification of the Earth scale influence of anthropogenic 
systems, but the parallel emergence of these non-human assemblages as sympoietically 
formative to all anthropogenic existences. In the historical moment marked by the 
Anthropocene, we come to realise that to exist without influence, from both within and without, is 
unavoidable, and that a more-than-human thought is not only made necessary, but actually 
made possible. We find in the Anthropocene not just potential realisation of the agency of 
humanity as a species-being, but also a kind of planetary agency, the agency of the Earth as a 
system in itself. The “age of man”, wherein Anthropos, the Vitruvian He, achieves mastery over 
his environment, is at once the realisation of man’s irrevocable dependencies and 
entanglements with this environment. As Claire Colebrook writes, the Anthropocene has in a 
sense always been with us: ‘If the Anthropocene - today - is possible, this is because its 
potentiality haunted the very constitution of the human as a political animal [...] To be ​political ​is 
34 Heather Davies, Etienne Turpin, ‘Art & Death: Lives Between the Fifth Assessment & the Sixth 
Extinction’ in ​Art in the Anthropocene ​ed.Heather Davies, Etienne Turpin,​ ​(London: Open Humanities 
Press, 2015) p.6 
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not just to be, but to be ​in-relation’​.  The Anthropocene marks humanity’s understanding of 35
itself as not simply a species but a species that exists among others - relations (both past and 
future) that are indispensable to its existence. This means the Anthropocene can only arrive too 
late, since this realisation takes place only in light of these relations’ imminent destruction. We 
become aware of the conditions of our terrestrial existence only through the possibility of 
mourning them. So, we see that if the Anthropocene does then in a sense signal the age of 
mankind, it also signals the potential for the destruction of mankind as we know it. Once we 
realise man is powerful enough to alter planetary systems, we realise that these altered systems 
are powerful enough to render man’s environment uninhabitable. The conditions under which 
we achieve planetary agency are marked by growing evidence of the increasing hostility of the 
environments we supposedly, if the narrative is to be accepted, have the ability to control.  
It is precisely this necessitation of more-than-human thought that calls the Anthropocene 
into question as an appropriate designation for our current ecological and geo-historical 
moment. Despite its widespread use, and for some of the reasons I have already briefly noted, 
the term is criticised across virtually all of the disciplines in which it can be applied. In the 
humanities, various counter narratives, most of which direct focus from the generalised figure of 
Anthropos onto a particular history (that of capitalism, patriarchy or slavery, for example), have 
been proposed in hope of not only better contextualising our current situation but also in holding 
to account a “guilty” sub-section of humanity with a view to overcome the systems it 
perpetuates. This sense of the Anthropocene’s detachment from any sense of localised reality - 
in this case, its social-historical context - can here be attributable to the encompassing, univocal 
whole placed over what is in actual fact a network of divergent political, economic, cultural and 
ethical factors acting to independent and self-determined ends. Clark writes:  
35 Claire Colebrook, ‘What is the Anthropo-political?’ in ​Twilight of the Anthropocene Idols ​(London: Open 
Humanities Press, 2016) p.82 
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 ‘The cliche of humanity having become a geological force has implications beyond the 
fact of human violence against the Earth and other species. A geological force is also an 
impersonal one, one that, like plate tectonics or earthquakes, does not heed entreaties, 
respect individual rights or admit of being altered by human decisions. In this case, 
however, the geological force at issue is, paradoxically, a total effect of innumerable 
human decisions’.  36
 
We are faced with a situation in which humanity as composed of individual actors is removed 
from humanity as a geophysical agency, wherein to conceptualise humanity as such is to erase 
the human itself. Humanity as Anthropos is spectralised, operative at a higher level of 
complexity than any individual human is capable of perceiving. The effects of geophysical man 
can therefore be conceived as a kind of sublimation of a spectral frequency, meaning, as is the 
case when confronting the spectre, we are faced with a paradox. “Man” as a single unit, a term 
to be understood along with all of its hierarchical baggage, remains devoid of any actual 
humanity. If the paradox of the environmental crisis as a diverse proliferation of 
more-than-human effects and processes implies the dislocation of the embodied human actor 
from the ecological assemblage of which it is a constitutive part - yet which, if we are to accept 
Anthropos as a geological force, it has a determining power over - what can be achieved by 
designating the geohistorical moment that brackets this ecological situation as the 
Anthropocene? Through the propagation of this narrative we risk upholding the modernist 
distinctions between mankind and nature, one that ultimately rests on the dynamic of exploiter 
and exploited, of man as active and dominant and nature as passive and submissive. The 
36 Timothy Clark, ​Ecocriticism on the Edge ​(London: Bloomsbury, 2015) p.16 
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environment and its crisis remains always “over there”, meaning the individual cannot be 
implicated, since any individual action does not constitute an environmental issue. Therefore, if 
we follow this line of thought to its conclusion and we find species-man guilty, implicating 
Anthropos as a geological force, this affirms the modernistic hubris that gives veracity to the 
claim that if mankind now possesses the capacity to alter the cycles of Earth, then surely it also 
has the capacity to mitigate any incoming environmental catastrophes. We must therefore 
attend to an intellectual methodology that is not based on the synthesis of aporia, since we find 
that, in this inherently aporetic scenario, any sense of synthesis or finality only entails a kind of 
despotism, upholding rather than dismantling the supremacy of the anthropocentric perspective 
we are confined to. 
However, as I said, discrepancies are not just confined to the humanities. There are 
disputes within the “hard” sciences also, and perhaps the best example of the Anthropocene’s 
displacement from itself is to be found here: that, in an explicitly geochronological sense as per 
Crutzen and Stoermer’s original formulation, the term is in fact still informal, with the 
formalisation process, primarily led by recommendation of the Anthropocene Working Group, 
still in its initial stages.  In this case most of the contention comes from the multifaceted 37
existence of the Anthropocene as a political imperative or cultural symbol, a generally accepted 
and propagated description of our dire environmental prognosis, and the Anthropocene as a 
formally accepted geological time unit. We therefore find ourselves in the peculiar position of, as 
Carlos Santana puts it, ‘waiting for the Anthropocene’.  The Anthropocene is upheld as an 38
articulation of an essentially geochronological notion that is in many ways dislocated from 
previously accepted definitions of geochronological units. Zalasiewicz et al. write:  
37 Valentí Rull, ‘What If the ‘Anthropocene’ Is Not Formalized as a New Geological Series/Epoch?’ in 
Quaternary ​1(3), 24 ​(2018) 
38 Carlos Santana, ‘Waiting for the Anthropocene’ in ​The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 
(2018) 
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 ‘More or less effective recognition of such a unit today (with annual/decadal resolution) is 
facies dependent and variably compromised by the disturbance of stratigraphic 
superposition that commonly occurs at geologically brief temporal scales, and that 
particularly affects soils, deep marine deposits and the pre-1950 parts of current urban 
areas. The Anthropocene, thus, more than any other geological time unit, is locally 
affected by such blurring of its chronostratigraphic boundary with Holocene strata. 
Nevertheless, clearly separable representatives of an Anthropocene Series may be 
found in lakes, land ice, certain river/delta systems, in the widespread dredged parts of 
shallow marine systems on continental shelves and slopes and in those parts of 
deepwater systems where human-rafted debris is common. From a far future 
perspective, the boundary is likely to appear geologically instantaneous and 
stratigraphically significant’.   39
 
Man waits for his own epoch, a point in time that has from one perspective already arrived, and 
that, from another, will perhaps not arrive at all: ‘signs of humanity’s status as a geological force 
are everywhere’, yet the Anthropocene, as a way of describing this situation, remains withdrawn 
from the kind of localised reality necessary to complete its manifestation; from the defined 
stratigraphic boundary needed to recognise it formally, and from the figure of the unified 
Anthropos implicated in its creation.   40
There is therefore a noticeable interplay between problems with the Anthropocene as 
articulated in the humanities and as articulated in the hard sciences found in this promissory 
39 ​Jan Zalasiewicz, Mark Williams, Colin N. Waters, ‘​Can an Anthropocene Series be defined and 
recognized?’ in ​Geological Society, London, Special Publications​ (2014) p.39 
40 ‘Waiting for the Anthropocene’, p.1 
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temporality of that which is to come - that to think the Anthropocene and its ecological 
implications, we must open our current intellectual frameworks to a series of divergent 
spatiotemporal scales that remain always beyond any human conception. Such a thought does 
not require reconciliation of the not-yet-present with the present, but an understanding of the 
non-present as constitutive of the present, as immanent to the present as a perceived interiority. 
The geochronological superposition mentioned above is essentially describing the impinging of 
non-presence into presence. The Holocene, a formally recognised unit as per conventional 
geological measures, is interrupted by a thing that is so far not wholly quantifiable by the same 
means. If presence is simply an articulation of being according to a particular methodology or 
tradition of thought, the Anthropocene as a geochronological unit exists in a state of 
quasi-presence, at the same time here and not-here, with future virtualities rushing in to occupy 
the space in the methodologies or traditions the concept interrupts. Therefore, thinking the 
Anthropocene from a geological perspective requires a similar kind of deconstructive temporal 
motion as thinking it from the perspective of the humanities. They both have to deal with a kind 
of detachment of the concept from itself, a dislocation of the term from its described realities, the 
contamination of the here-now by the there-then. We can therefore see that the concept is 
interstitial, hovering between various contexts and definitions, existing in a multifactorial state, 
essentially irreplaceable, yet also, by conventional measures of consistency and irrefutability, 
inherently aporetic. Even if the Anthropocene is formalised as a geological epoch this sense of 
anachronistic groundlessness remains, since the situation it describes threatens the existence 
of the Anthropos that defines the epoch as such, describing timescales that, again, extend far 
beyond the limits of the human: ‘man’s effect on the planet will supposedly be discernible as a 
geological strata readable well after man ceases to be, even if there are no geologists who will 
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be present to undertake this imagined future reading’; or, as Tom Cohen puts it, ‘a “possible 
future hermeneutic” which one must go extinct to test’.   4142
We can therefore propose that the Anthropocene does not operate in the discourse in 
spite of its counterintuitiveness, but because of it. Like the ghost of Hamlet’s father that 
catalyses the events of the play, the non-present presence that determines all activity 
undertaken in the delimitations of materialised reality, the term’s liminality imbues it with a 
certain generative potential. We wait for the Anthropocene because we can only wait for the 
Anthropocene, and in its place - that of a more grounded, practical concept formulated to 
particular ethical, hospitable ends - we find a proliferation of sub and counter narratives; 
capitalocene, plantationocene, gynocene, nucleocene, and so on. This is not simply a case of 
overeager scholarship, creating concepts around an idea that is itself only partially (and will 
remain so, by its nature) formed. Instead, to attempt to theorise the Anthropocene is to at once 
construct something other than the Anthropocene, a narrative that comprehends and properly 
articulates a particular history only partially manifested in the Anthropocene concept itself.  
Donna Haraway writes: 
 
‘I along with others think the Anthropocene is more a boundary event than an epoch, like 
the K-Pg boundary between the Cretaceous and the Paleogene. The Anthropocene 
marks severe discontinuities; what comes after will not be like what came before. I think 
our job is to make the Anthropocene as short/thin as possible and to cultivate with each 
other in every way imaginable epochs to come that can replenish refuge’.  43
41 Claire Colebrook, ​Death of the Posthuman: Essays on Extinction vol I ​(London: Open Humanities 
Press, 2014) p.10 
42 Tom Cohen, ‘Trolling “Anthropos” - Or, Requiem for a Failed Prosopopeia’ in ​Twilight of the 
Anthropocene Idols, ​p.53 
43 Donna Haraway, ​Making Kin in the Chthulucene ​(London: Duke University Press, 2016) p.100 
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 Discontinuities harbour creative potential, an openness to both past and future, that which is no 
longer and that which is to be, instantiating a motion of becoming-other that catalyses change. 
Everything begins by the apparition of the spectre, and, specifically, the waiting for this 
apparition. There is in this anticipation of change, in the change that anticipation promises, the 
same energy Derrida associates with the​ ​ghost - ‘at once impatient, anxious and fascinated: 
this, the thing (“this thing”) will end up coming. The ​revenant ​is going to come. It won’t be long’.  44
This begs the question: how then, if we are put in a situation where we must act in mind of that 
which we fundamentally cannot understand, can we approach the problems raised by the 
Anthropocene and the ecological situation it defines? Of course, these two issues are always 
intertwined; the aporia of the Anthropocene concept signifies an aporia in our approaches to 
ecological thought. To reconcile with or understand that which remains outside of our very 
capacities for reconciliation or understanding requires a shift in the metaphysical frameworks 
through which we access reality. However, this implies that any reconciliation or understanding 
we achieve by way of such a methodology will not necessarily be discernible as “reconciliation” 
or “understanding” at all. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
44 Derrida, ​Spectres of Marx, ​p.2 
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ALWAYS MORE THAN ONE 
 
It serves to mention here that Derrida’s conception of spectrality does not stand alone. As well 
as a term signifying a state between being and non-being, presence and absence, the spectre is 
itself shared between a range of historical contexts, and in a markedly Derridean manner, the 
traces of these excluded modes cannot be completely expunged. In reference to the interstitial 
nature of the spectre as a critical tool, Maria del Pilar Blanco and Esther Peeren note that ‘this 
aspect of ​both … and - ​which is equally one of ​neither … nor’, ​is based on a series of binary 
oppositions (presence/absence, living/dead, human/non-human) generated from a set of 
essentially Western ideals.  To use the figure of the ghost as a method of critical inquiry 45
therefore implies in some respects a similar univocality to the figure of Anthropos conjured by 
the Anthropocene. This is not in reference to the negative internal hierarchisation of the 
Anthropos, that humanity as a whole is responsible for the climate crisis rather than any specific 
hegemonic group or political or economic system, but that the term itself has the potential to 
silence the diverse alternative and nuanced articulations of the ecological situation that may be 
indispensable to the discourse. As Haraway writes: ‘Anthropocene is a term most easily 
meaningful and usable by intellectuals in wealthy classes and regions; it is not an idiomatic term 
for climate, weather, land, care of country, or much else in great swathes of the world, especially 
but not only among indigenous peoples’.   46
While this potential for obfuscation and univocalisation can be revealed through 
deconstruction as a symptom of all significatory acts, in a twofold motion of description and 
enactment, when used as a critical term the diachronic hauntings of the ghost actually serve to 
45 Pilar Blanco, Peeren, ‘Spectropoetics: Ghosts of the Global Contemporary / Introduction’ in ​The 
Spectralities Reader: Ghosts and Haunting in Contemporary Cultural Theory,​ p.91 
46 Donna Haraway, ‘Tentacular Thinking: Anthropocene, Capitalocene, Chthulucene’ in ​e-flux Journal #75 
(https://www.e-flux.com/journal/75/67125/tentacular-thinking-anthropocene-capitalocene-chthulucene/) 
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illustrate an example of deconstructive spectralisation: the displacement, marginalisation or 
exclusion of certain beings, entities or concepts outside of an established, dominant order. As I 
have already said, almost all arguments against the use of the term Anthropocene are framed at 
least partly in this way; that the figure of a unified Anthropos subsumes and therefore equally 
implicates all of the various divergent arrangements of human populations in a crisis instigated 
by a relative minority, or, as in Haraway’s point above, that the Anthropocene concept itself 
absorbs and nullifies all of its sub or counter narratives - ‘drown[ing] out other scales and figures 
with its blinding light’.  Our present use of the figure of the ghost is therefore potentially subject 47
to, although in somewhat different ways, similar problematics of genealogy. Pilar Blanco and 
Peeren see the ghost as exemplary of Mieke Bal’s notion of the ‘travelling concept’: that, as 
tools for intersubjective understanding, concepts are not fixed but often ‘overlap’, existing 
between various contexts and definitions.  This can be read as a development of Edward 48
Said’s ‘travelling theory’, based on the observation that ‘ideas and theories travel - from person 
to person, from situation to situation, from one period to another’, however ‘[s]uch movement 
into a new environment is never unimpeded’.  Said’s approach, focussing on the movement of 49
entire theories rather than concepts, is somewhat less specific than Bal’s, but both works can be 
read as part of the same general project. Said emphasises historical context, observing the 
limits and possibilities theories reveal once they are uprooted from these contexts and applied 
elsewhere, that the boundaries and reach of a theory emerge in motion, where it is also most 
subject to forces of representation and institutionalisation. Bal instead examines the semiology 
of concepts, with the interstitial nature of terms and the pathways of intersubjective 
communication they open being a central component of interdisciplinary methodologies​. ​The 
47 Tom Cohen, Claire Colebrook, ​Twilight of the Anthropocene Idols​ p.8 
48 Pilar Blanco, Peeren, ​Popular Ghosts: The Haunted Spaces of Everyday Culture ​(London: Continuum, 
2010) 
49 Edward Said, ​The Text, The World, The Critic​ (MA: Harvard University Press, 1983) p.226 
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instability of concepts generates inventive potentialities, and lines of flight between 
interdisciplinary modes are revealed through liminal terms ‘[n]ot because they mean the same 
thing for everyone, but because they don’t’.  For Bal, these disjunctions provide novel 50
discursive opportunities so long as they are ‘worked through’ in order to prevent 
misunderstanding or partisanship regarding a specific application or interpretation.  For Said 51
theories are in a sense never complete. In their travels through space and time, through various 
conceptual “turns” (ontological, spatial, linguistic, spectral), something is always left behind. It is 
therefore the duty of the critic ‘to provide resistances to theory, to open it up toward historical 
reality, toward society, toward human needs and interests’, to operate beyond the theory’s 
circumscribed interpretive area and in accordance with the everyday realities in which they are 
applied.   52
We see this potential for both invention and erasure in the diverse sociolinguistic 
genealogies of the ghost, where its multiple uses as both ordinary word and theoretical tool can 
reveal various creative pathways while simultaneously being capable of neutralising them. Since 
travels reveal histories, we find that the concept of spectrality is itself haunted: ‘Instead of 
demanding a distancing, the twists and turns of haunting manifest as a layering, a palimpsestic 
thinking together, simultaneously, rather than a thinking against or after’.  To speak of a ghost 53
is to speak of multiple ghosts, and this act of invocation, in accordance with Derrida, defines the 
process of signification. All texts are haunted by their interpretations, all concepts are haunted 
by their applications in exogenous orders. Derrida writes: ‘To haunt does not mean to be 
present, and it is necessary to introduce haunting into the very construction of a concept. Of 
50 Pilar Blanco, Peeren,​ Popular Ghosts: The Haunted Spaces of Everyday Culture,​ p.xi 
51 Mieke Bal, ​Travelling Concepts in the Humanities ​(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002) p.26 
52 Ibid. p.242 
53 Pilar Blanco, Peeren, ‘The Spectral Turn’ in ​The Spectralities Reader: Ghosts and Haunting in 
Contemporary Cultural Theory, ​p.32 
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every concept, beginning with the concepts of being and time’.  Concepts are, as resigned to 54
the realm of signification, always in a state of displacement, and articulated in a deconstructive 
sense the spectre does indeed depart from its previous historical uses and definitions. However 
this departure and subsequent displacement from its prior contexts and readings in fact 
exemplifies the very action that the term in the deconstructive sense describes, hence its value 
as a conceptual metaphor. As Peter Buse and Andrew Stott write:  
 
‘Deconstruction's ghosts, then, are considerably different from those found in the 
majority of fictional haunting narratives with which we have been familiar [...] For 
deconstruction, a removal of all forms of haunting in the face of such awesome 
referential categories represents an artificial and unworkable imposition placed upon 
such concepts. Like the appearance of the ghost, the origin and its repetition are 
coterminous with one another. Thus, no signification can be unproblematically sutured to 
the originary context of its production, as the sign is haunted by a chain of 
overdetermined readings, mis-readings, slips and accretions that will always go beyond 
the event itself’.  55
 
An unspoken, unintelligible, arche-originary condition, the non-presence of the mark that is 
displaced from the instance of the material sign, describes the spectral action of differance and 
the chain of hauntings through which signification emerges. By utilising the ghost as a 
conceptual metaphor, we are at once provided with a description and enactment of the 
differance of signification. All of the ghost’s diachronic, extra-contextual meanings are repeated 
54 Derrida, ​Specters of Marx, ​p.202 
55 Peter Buse, Andrew Stott, ‘Introduction: a Future for Haunting’ in ​Ghosts: Deconstruction, 
Psychoanalysis, History ​(London: Macmillan, 1999) p.12 
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with it, meaning the sign is never all there; never fully present in the event of its use, always 
determined by a trace network of deferred non-presences. When we use the figure of the ghost 
in the context of deconstruction, we invoke all of its prior non-contemporaneous definitions and 
contextualisations, thereby allowing us to glimpse (inaccessibly; comprehended 
incomprehensibly, since the process cannot be measured or determined in itself, occurring as it 
does outside of our frameworks of knowledge and meaning as determined by the significatory 
process it instantiates) the nature of the sign as irreducible from its extraneous contexts. We 
can therefore bring the notion of the travelling concept into the framework of the spectral, where 
to move between contexts is to be haunted by all prior instances of the sign that are not present 
in its current manifestation. A proliferation of ghosts.  
Now, I have already spoken of the interstitial nature of the Anthropocene in a terrestrial 
sense so there is no need to reiterate it here, but we can see from the language introduced 
above that it remains in practice also strung somewhat awkwardly between “theory” and 
“concept”. Its generative potential comes not from its shared meanings but from its inability to be 
deployed in any one discourse without necessary reference to another. All others, in fact - all 
discourses in which the term has any purchase or relevance at all are mobilised simultaneously 
in the instance of its use, yet are always subordinated through the necessary dominance of the 
framework that informs our current perspective. Its differance is therefore intrinsically tied with 
its conceptual, theoretical function, meaning the concept is not inter-disciplinary but inherently 
trans-disciplinary, in that it cuts across disciplines while remaining in essence unchanged. In 
thinking the Anthropocene the disciplinary boundaries themselves are agitated - the study being 
undertaken cannot be said to fall exclusively within one field or another, but is conducted in the 
unspecified space of their overlapping, always being haunted by its extraneous contexts, where, 
despite their imperceptibility from any given perspective, these parts still have influence over the 
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modes from which they are excluded. We can even go as far as to say that this is in fact the 
condition of thinking the Anthropocene in any sense, that the Anthropocene necessitates a 
productive hauntology beyond its own metaphysics of presence, summoning a transdisciplinary 
network that in its heterogeneity naturally entails a kind of change on the conceptual level. While 
in the case of the ghost or spectre its usefulness as a deconstructive trope is derived from the 
sign’s openness to trouble, performing the process of deconstruction through its invocation of 
otherwise repressed narratives, if our goal is to achieve a kind of creative escape from prior 
intellectual frameworks, the Anthropocene (if we are arguing for its usefulness) is productive in 
its ability to trouble any framework in which it is deployed. By the same token, it is difficult to 
describe the Anthropocene as a theory that “travels” in the sense described by Said. Granted, it 
is dispersed across various disciplinary plateaus and studied from the perspectives of many 
different field-specific methodologies, but again, its transdisciplinary nature means it is not 
altered in any way by this multifactorial analysis since a degree of flexibility to alteration is 
already woven into the concept itself. Therefore, to trace a history of the Anthropocene as it 
relates to any localised sense of historical materiality is simply to create an entirely new theory, 
a new concept: a capitalocene, plantationocene, nucleocene, etc. It demands multiplicity, while 
at the same time, paradoxically, constricting the narrative divergences it produces. 
We can again trace this back to the Anthropocene’s displacement from the 
historical-material reality it describes. That, on the one hand, the diverse social, economic, 
cultural and political formations that constitute our current ecological situation cannot, as 
Haraway would have it, be thought through the figure of species-man; and that, on the other, 
from the stratigraphic perspective - the superimposed, spectralised terrestrial grounding that 
haunts the Anthropocene when it is applied in any non-stratigraphic context - the Anthropocene 
is, and can never be, fully realised. As Colebrook says, to think the Anthropocene in such a way 
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requires the conjuring of a future geologist, a future observational apparatus and a future 
system of knowledge through which to read the stratigraphic scar it describes, long after 
geologists, observational apparatuses and even systems of knowledge as they are currently 
conceived have ceased to exist. It marks the point at which the decidedly human temporality of 
such perceptual frameworks is torn asunder by the deep time of the earthly conditions that give 
rise to the concept. In this remaining substrate we see the return of the human as a 
‘retro-hologram’ in an entirely non-human space-time.  We are forced to reconcile with a 56
temporality that remains entirely inaccessible, and this distant future is brought into the present 
as an encounter with non-presence, in the same impossibility of a completely “present” time that 
gives rise to the method of ecological thought in general. Our conception of a here-now, 
present-present position relies on Dasien, a certain Being-there within time that constitutes it as 
such, but in this scenario, there is no Dasien. No presence through which to conceive of the 
present as present. These markers are opened to an entirely inhuman time, an inhuman mode 
of being within which the human remains inscribed in its stratigraphic scar. Therefore, one could 
argue that the Anthropocene, despite being deeply interwoven with the Earth itself - the very 
“ground” upon which all terrestrial beings exist - remains in a state of groundlessness. Its ethical 
injunction lies in this earthly context, yet the unimaginable timescales of geochronology and the 
bewildering, incomprehensible systems of climate change mean that the concept itself, as 
something inseparable from the anthropogenic conditions from which it necessarily emerges, 
describes phenomena that remain inaccessible from inside these perceptual boundaries.  
Its groundlessness is founded in the differance of humanity, as a species capable of 
“reading” its own inscription, from the stratigraphic scar in which it is inscribed. This inscription 
occupies the place of the originary mark that contextualises all language, all signification and 
56 Cohen, ‘Trolling “Anthropos” - Or, Requiem for a Failed Prosopopeia’, p.53 
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therefore all meaning, yet remains always outside or beyond any instance of language itself. It is 
the radical alterity immanent to the sign, the extraneous context that structures understanding. 
In this case, if we can only conceive of “man” as a species through its capacity to inscribe itself 
on the planet, the existence of the Anthropocene as a set of material-discursive conditions is 
always partially lost in the originary affirmation of this inscription, meaning species-man remains 
dislocated from its terrestrial contextualisation: 
 
‘One gags on the ironies: the term “Anthropocene” can only arrive in (or after) the twilight 
of what it names, so it can only anticipate or legitimize itself from a future recognition of 
it, after a disappearance it implies is accomplished. It projects a proleptic anterior 
“inscription”. It would have inscribed a proper name into crashed life-systems, “earth”, 
mutated materialities, defaced surfaces, exploited genetic codes - an inscription that 
would have to be read (that is, given recognition) by another eye entirely’.   57
 
This means that as soon as the Anthropocene is conceived as inscription it tacitly necessitates 
its own duplication:  
 
‘to talk of inscription is not just to talk about language or even visual composition in its 
narrow sense; it is not only to concur with Latour that any scientific account is composed 
from technical readings, adjustments, concerns, interests and affect. Rather, it is to see 
the world, the earth, the climate - all these unities that we are witnessing as being 
changed utterly - as effects of complex systems of relations that are irreducibly multiple’.
  58
57 Ibid.​ ​p.23 
58 Cohen, Colebrook, ​Twilight of the Anthropocene Idols,​ p.13 
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 The transdisciplinary multiplication of the Anthropocene operates through the same mechanism; 
that it remains, in its interstitiality, withdrawn in part from any framework of interpretation. The 
duplication of Anthropocene as inscription opens the concept to a future, and by extension, an 
other. This other is that through which the concept can be thought at all, yet which at the same 
time interrupts, displaces and deconstructs it, revealing but partially the complex assemblages 
that give form not only to the concept, all concepts, but terrestrial existence itself.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
32 
HAUNTOLOGY: AN ETHICS OF THE UN-IMMEDIATE 
 
Although numerous approaches to the Anthropocene both as a critical field and ethico-political 
injunction have been proposed from various perspectives, a deconstruction serves to 
counterbalance both the semiotic, narrative discrepancies toward the Anthropocene as a term 
with the ethical imperatives of the environmental crisis occurring alongside it. Indeed, it is the 
dual thinking of these two factors - the significatory and the ethical - that is at the core of 
deconstruction as a philosophical method. While it may seem in some ways an overly 
introspective or theoretical approach for dealing with such an immanent and potentially 
catastrophic situation, the radically disruptive effects of climate change - not just on the physical 
systems of the planet but also the boundaries between the disciplines and methodologies 
through which it is studied: ‘a peculiarly monstrous cultural/political/economic/ 
philosophical/ethical and scientific hybrid in Bruno Latour’s sense [...] a condensed cipher for 
the destabilisation of such previously decisive dyads as nature/culture, science/politics, 
fact/value’ - calls for an approach that is not simply conscious of such disruption, but that in fact 
works ​through ​it: 
 
‘With the thought of climate change, topics that have been the focus of kinds of 
deconstructive reading or debate over the decades - the closure of Western 
metaphysics, the ethical claims of nonhuman life, the auto-immunity of democratic 
institutions, the limits of classical economic accounting, definitions of the human, the 
conflict of the faculties, the concepts of borders and boundaries, the nature of 
responsibility etc. - all now seem put into play at the same time’.  59
59 Clark, ‘Some Climate Change Ironies: Deconstruction, Environmental Politics and the Closure of 
Ecocriticism’, pp.137-138 
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 It seems to raise the question: how can the apparent incoherency of such a thing be studied at 
all, without risking any potential oversimplification, reduction or obfuscation? A deconstruction 
involves thinking ​with ​these relations with the un-immediate, the imperceptible and incoherent, 
acting from the present for the sake of the non-present in both the spatial and temporal senses 
of the word. The resounding cry opening Matthias Fritsch et al.’s collection of 
eco-deconstructive criticism: ‘We cannot go on like this!’ marks an interruption of the boundaries 
of preexisting structures of thought that a deconstruction seeks to reveal.  Indeed, we cannot 60
go on like this, and this injunction is above all an ethical one - concerning as it does the question 
of human agency in relation to our terrestrial kin. Fritsch et al. write, with regards to the field of 
various eco-philosophical methodologies adjacent to eco-deconstruction (eco-phenomenology, 
eco-hermeneutics, ecocriticism, ecofeminism, etc.): 
 
‘Each of these approaches, perhaps following the contextualist logic of the ​eco-, ​is 
driven to expansion of its scope [...] on the basis of a shared condition of domination and 
exploitation. [...] If the prefix ​eco- ​points to the significance of natural/environmental 
context, it might be said that the distinctive thrust of eco-deconstruction is to affirm the 
significance of context, both “on the ground” as it were, and methodologically’.  61
 
Eco-deconstruction, as Fritsch et al. point out, ‘vigorously maintains a tension between 
contextual expansion and caution toward any impatient totalizing consolidation of a new frame 
of reference’, in line with the general deconstructive tenet that ‘there is no “final analysis” no 
60 Matthias Fritsch, Phillipe Lynes, David Wood, ‘Introduction’ in ​Eco-Deconstruction: Derrida and 
Environmental Philosophy ​(NY: Fordham University Press, 2018) p.1 
61 Ibid. p.5 
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ultimate frame’.  If, as I have said, the aporia of the Anthropocene and the environmental 6263
crisis in general requires an approach that does not demand synthesis but an ongoing process 
of becoming-together, we can immediately see how the deconstructive method can be useful in 
thinking through such problems. I say “through” here not in the sense of using the Anthropocene 
as an interpretive lens, but that in the disruption of its boundaries we can take into account both 
the interior and exterior factors that give rise to the Anthropocene as a material-discursive 
phenomenon; understanding that which is immanent to any given aesthetic, perceptual, or 
intellectual framework, while performing an analytic step “through” this framework to 
comprehend (albeit incomprehensibly) its constitutive externalities, its impenetrably complex 
terrestrial contexts. Pursuing an environmental justice in the Anthropocene does not simply 
involve implicating a guilty Anthropos, but a constant moving beyond any instance of law by 
which the finality of such an implication would arise. This therefore suggests a kind of 
quasi-normative ethics emerging alongside the futural dimension that is opened through the 
quasi-ontological relationality of the spectre, one that is not based on a closed universality but 
open to the promissory future of a justice-to-come.  
Derrida explains this deconstructive, ethical opening that disrupts the bounds of ontology 
through the figure of the ghost, and in so doing introduces the concept of hauntology, an 
analytic within the deconstructive tradition that does not require its objects of study to 
materialise, exist or disperse in the classical sense. As one of the main proponents and 
popularisers of hauntology in the mid 00’s, where the concept ‘gained its second (un)life’ online, 
Mark Fisher writes: hauntology ‘is in part a restatement of the key deconstructive claim that 
“being” is not equivalent to ​presence.​ Since there is no point of pure origin, only the time of the 
62 Ibid. 
63 Ibid. p.6 
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‘always-already’, then haunting is the state proper to being as such’.  In its native French the 64
neologism ​hauntologie ​sounds identical to ​ontologie, ​a play that emphasises Derrida’s critique 
of phonocentrism as well as illustrating the alternative materialisations and existences 
foregrounded in the hauntological approach, introducing a discourse that centers on kinds of 
non-present beings previously marginalised and excluded by that which is understood to be 
“present” according to more conventional understandings of space and time, text and discourse. 
These conventional understandings are rooted in the language of atomism, the metaphysical 
system of predetermined relata that underpins classical Newtonian and Cartesian mechanics - 
‘the traditional “ontology” that thinks being in terms of self-identical presence’.  A hauntology 65
works to deconstruct this approach, suggesting that being as a category of existence is 
inseparable from its hauntings, its absent presences; a relational structure that does not give 
precedence to materialities defined along linear timescales or a here-now approach to existence 
based on an atomist metaphysics. As David Wood notes: 
 
‘Derrida writes of the need for a double strategy: immanent critique and the step beyond, 
working within the closure of metaphysics, and attempting a creative leap outside its 
borders [...] as soon as we realise that inside/outside operate within a signifying space, 
the clarity of the distinction starts to break down, and so, too, do the moves that 
presuppose the stable operation of this signification’.   66
 
64 Mark Fisher, ‘The Metaphysics of Crackle: Afrofuturism and Hauntology’ in ​Dancecult: Journal of 
Electronic Dance Music Culture 5(2),​ p.44 
65 Mark Fisher,​ Ghosts of My Life: Writings on Depression, Hauntology and Lost Futures ​(Hants: Zero 
Books, 2014) p.18 
66 Wood, ‘Specters of Derrida: On the Way to Ecoconstruction’ p.268 
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Again, we can see the value that such an approach has in considering environmental issues. 
Clark quotes Charles S. Brown in a point that sums this problem up very effectively: ‘by defining 
our problems as either economic or biological, political or philosophical, we reproduce the 
structure of the academy, but fail to appreciate the kind of essential interconnections that 
ecological thinking in particular has emphasised’.  Again, we see that our situation calls for a 67
thinking with and responsibility for the un-immediate, the non-present, where “presence” 
designates all existences in the here-now of any given intellectual framework.  
We can in many ways therefore think of hauntology as the culmination of Derrida’s 
deconstructive project: ‘namely, the deconstruction of the metaphysics of the “proper”, of 
logocentrism, linguisticism, phonologism, the demystification or the desedimentation of the 
autonomic hegemony of language’.  Hauntology, although the deconstructive operation it 68
performs essentially already existed in other concepts, slightly modifies this notion of the 
metaphysics of the proper as its target of disruption, with a view to directly question the 
metaphysics of ​presence,​ problematising the automatic hegemony of being dictated in terms of 
self-identical existence by interrupting the metaphysical frameworks through which it is 
determined. It is along these marginal lines of disruption that hauntology, in accordance with the 
rest of the deconstructive method, operates. In advocating its status as an ‘irreducible 
discourse’, it is in a sense a precursor to an ontology of presence; the state of an ontological 
system as, by its very nature, already haunted by the non-presences it excludes: 
 
‘This logic of haunting would not be merely larger and more powerful than an ontology or 
a thinking of Being [...] It would harbor within itself, but like circumscribed places or 
67 Clark, ‘Some Climate Change Ironies: Deconstruction, Environmental Politics and the Closure of 
Ecocriticism’, p.138 
68 Derrida, ​Spectres of Marx, ​p. 115 
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particular effects, eschatology and teleology themselves. It would ​comprehend ​them, but 
incomprehensibly. How to comprehend in fact the discourse of the end or the discourse 
about the end? Can the extremity of the extreme ever be comprehended?’. 
 
As Simon Critchley writes: ​‘ontologie ​is an apocalyptic discourse on or of the end, whereas 
hauntologie ​is a discourse on the end of the end’.  It opens the closed metaphysics of ontology: 69
‘Ontology opposes it [hauntology] only in a movement of exorcism. Ontology is a conjuration’.  70
Such foundational metaphysical systems in fact rely on closure to cohere at all, since their 
status as foundational necessarily implies a limit, therefore exorcising the specters within 
through their conjuration, repositioning the spectral entities of the incomprehensible inside the 
limits of its own modes of comprehension. Once again this limit is founded on a notion of 
presence, and hauntology works to “tympanise” an ontology of presence, to agitate the limits of 
presence, identifying its enclosure in philosophemes in order to break down the categories of 
interior/exterior, known/unknown and presence/absence as purely significatory, establishing an 
ethics based on an openness and hospitality to the wholly other that is repressed by 
conventional, dominant, anthropocentric modes of knowledge and discourse.  
I have already mentioned a few times that this other - the spectralised, non-human, 
non-present that is excluded from the dominant order - exists in a state of symbiosis with this 
order; that, for example, human entanglements with the non-human manifest in a sympoietic 
becoming-together. This is a fundamental tenet of deconstruction, and while from an ecological 
perspective the notion of entanglement with inaccessible others does not require a great deal of 
explication, since there is nothing unusual about potentially exclusionary systems and cycles 
being reconceived as complex multi-species assemblages, we find that a hauntological 
69 Simon Critchley, ‘On Derrida’s Specters of Marx’ in ​Philosophy & Social Criticism, 21, 3​ (1995) p.4 
70 Derrida, ​Spectres of Marx, ​p.202 
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understanding is in fact based on the same kind of relational structure. However, hauntology as 
a deconstructive analytic is not used to “uncover” assemblages lost or buried within or outside a 
particular conception of reality, to drag networks of relations into the light and therefore risk 
constriction or overcoding by an observational apparatus or system of analysis. Rather, to 
describe hauntology in practice it serves again to emphasise the absolute otherness of the 
other; our ability to relate, converse and do justice to the other ​as ​other​.​ As Derrida says above, 
the logic of haunting is to comprehend incomprehensibly; to realise our formative relations with 
this other through preserving it as such, to resist assimilating it into our own conceptions of what 
it means to exist, be present, or to be understood or known at all. Derrida’s ‘ethical injunction’ 
concerning the other therefore consists in ‘not reducing it prematurely to an object of 
knowledge’; ‘One does not know: not out of ignorance, but because this non-object, this 
non-present present, this being-there of an absent or departed one no longer belongs to 
knowledge. At least no longer to that which one thinks one knows by the name of knowledge’.71
 72
We can therefore describe the hauntological object of study as suspended, a thing that 
can only be apprehended in its suspension: that which cannot be integrated in thought or 
language, warranting a method of examination that does not involve rearticulation in embodied 
or material terms. For Derrida it is this suspension, a dislocation from that which is immediately 
present or accessible, that creates the conditions for justice - a point that is reiterated 
throughout his work: 
 
‘No justice without aporia, without suspension. ‘[J]ustice’, Derrida writes, ‘would be the 
experience of what we are unable to experience’ - an experience accessible only 
71 Davis, ‘État Présent: Hauntology, Spectres and Phantoms’ p.58 
72 Derrida, ​Specters of Marx, ​p.5 
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through the mental movement of willing suspension. He opposes this justice to a concept 
of law, the ‘element of calculation’; the suspensive power of justice is what takes us 
beyond calculation, into the critical space able to open to the future. [...] The call to 
justice - and here we could also add terms like gift, forgiveness, the ethical - is a call 
never to have done, to a perpetual suspension that cuts across even seemingly 
successful instances, those times when justice is served and all sides seem to 
understand each other within an apparently shared idiom’.  73
 
Justice, democracy, responsibility and ethics in general operate by way of a futural dimension, 
always working ahead or beyond themselves, reaching, like the linguistic sign, to an outside of 
any event of its instantiation: the differance of the concept from the singularity of the event it 
describes. They concern the agency of that which is to come, the non-present of the temporal 
virtualities that must necessarily exceed their own conditions, meaning to enact justice is to 
enact its continuous deferral, to ensure a movement beyond any actual “application” of justice in 
the moment. Justice is therefore never “done” so to speak, since it is always already deferred 
from any single occurrence of justice in the lived present; it is always ‘not yet, not yet ​there’: 
‘justice, like the text, is never ​closed’.  ​As Colebrook notes, this differance or excess is again 7475
characteristic of the temporality of concepts in general: ‘justice, forgiveness, democracy and 
friendship have a power - as repeatable concepts - to extend, infinitely, into the future’ - ‘justice 
could not be reduced to any of its actual instances; if one uses a concept then one relies upon it 
being recognized because it exceeds any single context’.  If the pursuit of justice is necessarily 76
73 Anne C McCarthy, ‘Suspension’ in ​Jacques Derrida: Key Concepts ​ed. Claire Colebrook (London: 
Routledge, 2015) p.28 
74 Derrida, ​Specters of Marx, ​p.xviii 
75 Claire Colebrook, ‘Extinguishing Ability: How We Became Postextinction Persons’ in 
Eco-Deconstruction: Derrida and Environmental Philosophy, ​p.263 
76 Colebrook, ‘What is the Anthropo-political?’ p.100 
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suspended from any instance of its application, we are therefore responsible for preserving a 
framework in which the other can manifest as such (in suspension). For Derrida justice is always 
justice toward the other, a dimension of alterity. Since it is opposed to the closed structure of the 
law, justice itself is in essence always inaccessible, always dislocated from itself; haunted, 
since, as Derrida has said, we must introduce haunting into the construction of every concept. In 
other words, it is relational, entangled with the network of differentiated others that comprise 
extraneous temporal virtualities. It is the mode through which we are to relate to the other - the 
ghost, spectre, the non-present object of justice itself - in a way that preserves it. Therefore an 
eco-deconstruction, as Fritsch et al. write, demands a justice beyond law:  
 
‘for law is constituted in the modern West as thoroughly humanist, taking as its aim the 
proper of the human beyond mere mortal life. By contrast, Derrida’s work insists that 
normativity, including human responsibility for suffering beings, emerges precisely as a 
response to original differentiation and the mortality and unmasterable alterity it installs 
in living beings’.   77
 
Here, as Fritsch points out, the deconstructivist critique of a metaphysics of presence potentially 
implicates the viewpoint of ‘subjectivist projectionism’ from which claims of normative values are 
often made, where value is determined in relation to the embodied subject whose judgment 
assumes an objective status.  However, ‘the question of how normativity comes about [...] does 78
not disappear with this question’.  If the purpose of eco-deconstruction is to trouble the 79
boundaries between “human” and “nature”, “individual” and “environment”, then it naturally 
77 Fritsch et al. ​Eco-Deconstruction: Derrida and Environmental Philosophy, ​p.16 
78 Matthias Fritsch, ‘An Eco-Deconstructive Account of the Emergence of Normativity in “Nature” in ibid. 
p.284 
79 Ibid. 
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entails a deconstructive reinterpretation of normative ethics. If we take the ethical injunction of 
hauntology as a kind of reconciliation with radical alterity, then normativity emerges as 
something ‘(quasi)ontological’, something inherent in the emergence of the subject as being 
in-relation to others.  Fritsch provides three systems of individualisation from which ‘value’, as 80
the deciding factor of normative environmental ethics, is produced: an individual’s self-value, its 
capacity for suffering, or its interdependence on a wider ecological whole alongside which it 
emerges as a constituent part. He then uses Derrida’s concept of the double affirmation to think 
these divergent formulations alongside one another, that ‘a living being must affirm both itself 
and its others as a result of each living entity being constitutively and differentially related to 
other entities in its life context [...] affirmation must affirm, along with the self, the 
other-than-self’.   8182
From this, we can see that realisation of an individual’s self-value naturally implies the 
value of other beings or entities taken as part of an interdependent ecological whole: 
‘self-affirmation thus inevitably slips away or drifts into the context, in fact in an ultimately erratic, 
indefinite, open-ended way’ since, for Derrida, the outside context as something that remains 
fluid and mobile is also co-constitutive of any given identity; the integration of the outside in any 
interior, the trace of non-presence and so on.  Similarly, its capacity for suffering is realised 83
through a confrontation with the absolute alterity of death that it shares with all living organisms, 
the necessary mortality that conditions all life as such. Therefore, once the individual affirms its 
own self-value in the context of its own mortality, it also affirms the value of all mortal life. Now, I 
will not recall Fritsch’s complete explanation of the relations between these value systems, but it 
is important to mention that his point is not to tie them together in a harmonious structure that 
80 Ibid. p.285 
81 Ibid. 
82 Ibid. p.287 
83 Ibid. p.289 
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would disregard or smooth out their differences, but to realise, by way of a deconstruction, how 
these differentiations are mutually constitutive even in their tensions: ‘Given the intrinsically 
unstable and conflictual nature of double affirmation, [...] the goal in rethinking is not to eliminate 
tensions in the links [...] in environmental ethics above all we must be aware of harmonious 
value axiologies, the environment living off its tensions and, in fact, its own dying and rebirth’.  84
It is in this double affirmation that we can begin to grasp the temporality of justice as always 
to-come. Affirmation, since it is repeated, duplicated, also opens up a promissory future. Any 
affirmation is the promise of an affirmation to come. It is not itself the root of any normative 
morality or responsibility, but provides the foundation for an ethics or responsibility to emerge. 
The “yes” that exists “prior” to signification, the inscription that provides the affirmative 
conditions for signification to occur, is the arche-originary condition for value, an opening 
towards the other by way of a futural dimension that allows for the function of the sign. Again, 
this is the same deconstructive operation that Colebrook identifies in relation to the concept of 
justice as in excess to any given instance of itself, of justice “being done”. To experience justice 
in itself is impossible; again, since it can only be understood in suspension, it can never “be 
done” per se. It is always deferred from its embodied enaction, working by way of the to-come, 
conditioning the event of its occurrence as a promissory future. Justice, like the arche-originary 
“yes”, is itself without content, but the grounds upon which an affirmative value is produced - 
whereby “justice” as an embodied enaction can occur. Here we see this ecological function of 
dying and rebirth in the very process of signification, of the relationship between sign and 
context, where the originary affirmation is dissolved by the secondary affirmation, the 
emergence of meaning from its promissory conditions. It is this quasi-transcendental 
future-to-come that, through hauntology - what we could perhaps call here the quasi-ontological 
84 Ibid. 288 
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determination of being as necessarily relational - reveals a normative ethics not as produced by 
way of subjectivistic projectionism, but as a fundamental condition of our always-already being 
in relation to others.  
We therefore see that a justice determined by law is unsatisfactory in enacting an 
eco-deconstructive ethics. Indeed, for Derrida the construction of the law is in fact an act of 
violence, since ‘its inscription [...] must emerge in a manner that is groundless and without 
precedent’.  Law does not equate to normativity since we can say that a sense of normativity, a 85
quasi-normativity, arises from hauntological relationality. Meaning, if an idea of justice is not 
answerable to any kind of radical alterity, we risk constricting or erasing the relations that allow 
for ecological thought as thinking-with otherness. If justice is founded on this alterity, then to ​be 
just;​ ​to act justly not simply toward but ​with ​others as a fundamental condition of existence, is 
central to a hauntological understanding of time, of the anachrony of the spectral: ‘No justice [...] 
seems possible or thinkable without the principle of some responsibility, beyond all living 
present, within that which disjoins the living present’: 
 
‘Without this ​non-contemporaneity with itself of the living present,​ without that which 
secretly unhinges it, without this responsibility and this respect for justice concerning 
those who ​are not there,​ of those who are no longer or who are not yet ​present and 
living,​ what sense would there be to ask the question “where?” “where tomorrow?” 
“whither?”’.  86
 
Responsibility, justice and by extension ethics in general concern what is, in essence, the 
response-ability towards that which we cannot immediately access. Haraway writes: 
85 Colebrook, ‘What is the Anthropo-political?’, p.101 
86 Derrida, ​Specters of Marx,​ p.xviii 
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‘Response-ability is about both absence and presence, killing and nurturing, living and dying - 
and remembering who lives and who dies and how in the string figures of naturalcultural 
history’.  Therefore, this non-contemporaneity of presence is in fact a condition of ecological 87
existence. Ecology describes a network of entanglements and relations that must necessarily 
include those that are not present within the moment, the non-presences of beings either no 
longer or not yet part of the living present. The deconstructive interruption of the living present is 
therefore revealed in the very structure of living-together. We find that ecological existence in 
the Anthropocene as a time that rests on a tipping point wherein the here-now and there-then 
become, by way of an ethical injunction, inseparable, manifests a temporal structure that is 
necessarily hauntological; that, in its spatiotemporal indeterminacy, marks its coordinates 
through the immeasurable axes of spacing and temporisation. Both do not only require a 
movement beyond established intellectual frameworks, but reveal the latent alterities and 
aporias within the frameworks themselves. As a system of hierarchisation and segmentation law 
functions through an implicit anthropocentrism, meaning questions of living-together in terrestrial 
assemblages unthinkable from an anthropocentric perspective do not cease with the 
establishment of a law functioning solely in and as control and limitation, determining the 
articulation, organisation and segmentation of organisms. They require a moving beyond the 
law to reveal an ethics attuned to the constitutive outside, to allow for the ongoing alteration of 
the law so as to avoid the establishment of another set of hierarchies, a new arrangement of 
exploited and exploiting entities; that - if deconstruction of these hierarchies is achieved, the 
kinds of interruption and re-contextualisation that the various eco-methodologies work towards - 
87 Haraway, ​Staying with the Trouble: Making Kin in the Chthulucene, ​p.28 
45 
functions through the very resistance of the projectivist urge to establish a new one: ‘the 
ever-receding horizon of “the democracy to come”’.  88
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
88 J. Hillis Miller, ‘Reading Paul de Man While Falling into Cyberspace’ in ​Twilight of the Anthropocene 
Idols, ​p.186 
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INTERIOR EXTERNALITIES 
 
As I have already mentioned, the language of haunting evokes a specific spatiotemporality 
based on the same coaction of presence and absence that underpins Derrida’s formulation of 
signification in general. That ‘the structurality of structure - although it has always been involved, 
has always been neutralised or reduced, and this by a process of giving it a center or referring it 
to a point of presence, a fixed origin’.  This centre of origin is the result of the same reductionist 89
philosophical analytic as the aforementioned ontology of self-identical presence to which 
hauntology has been defined in contrast, a limit or constraint bounded by the immediate and 
knowable - a metaphysics of presence, in other words. Locating it within Derrida’s wider project, 
Fisher names hauntology simply ‘another moment in deconstruction - where “hauntology” would 
resume the work formerly done by concepts such as the trace or ​differance’.  ​These​ ​terms, as 90
is usual with Derrida’s concepts, share meanings, and therefore in part formulate and describe 
the operations of the spectre. If hauntology works to deconstruct an ontology of self-identical 
presence, it does so by emphasising the immanence of alterity - that a factor in any binary 
opposition is not determined by any inherent virtue but by the trace of that which it is not, the 
excluded other to which it is opposed. Just as in the act of haunting itself, whereby the present 
is revealed as a contingency, formed through the ingrained virtualities of past and future, that 
which is thought of as an exteriority is revealed as immanent to that which constitutes the 
interior. If this here-now interior is all we understand in relation to “us”, be it the conjoined 
securities of knowledge, meaning, locality or bodily presence, then the ghost exceeds this 
notion, exceeds “us” and the material notions of presence and knowledge we define in relation 
89 Derrida, ‘Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences’ in ​Writing and Difference 
(London: Routledge, 2001) p.352 
90 Mark Fisher, ‘What is Hauntology?’ in ​FIlm Quarterly ​(2012) p.19 
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to ourselves; always beyond embodied horizons of existence and meaning, yet never entirely 
separate from them. 
In line with deconstruction in general it is this sense of distant closeness that provides 
the ghost’s uncanny dimension, for this unsettling of concrete spatial coordinates does not only 
displace the figure of the ghost itself, the apparition of the spectre, but the orders within which 
the ​revenant ​appears: a reshaping of historical time, memory, and the narratives that comprise 
the future, as well as the life-defining phenomenon of death in the face of the thing ‘which has 
crossed over to the other unknowable side, and then come back’.  This means, to the interior 91
notion of “us”, it presents as paradoxical, occupying an outside: alien, yet not immaterial - 
composed of an alternative, inaccessible materiality, always somewhere beyond any kind of 
located, bodied space-time. As I have already said, the ghost is often conceptualised as the 
return of the repressed. The idea of the ghost as that which cannot fully transcend this worldly 
dimension due the trauma of its original exclusion, an interpretation based on the notion of 
trauma as that which ‘can never be assimilated or that can be assimilated only as radically 
inassimilable’, can be traced back to the work of the psychoanalytic unconscious, the operations 
of ‘censorship and repression, condensation and displacement’ that ‘keep what they cause to 
disappear’.  Since it returns only once, and then once again, the ​revenant ​is the return of the 92
point of death itself, the inevitable return of a traumatic spectacle, the point of suffering, 
confusion and extinction. This is the uncanny alterity of the ghost’s negation of bodiliness, that 
to occupy any interior is to be defined in relation to an exterior with which we are always in 
communication.  
91 Mansfield, ‘There is a Spectre Haunting … ’: Ghosts, Their Bodies, Some Philosophers, a Novel and 
the Cultural Politics of Climate Change’  
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The terms ghost, ​revenant, ​spectre and phantom are all roughly equivalent in that they 
describe a condition of haunting, of being haunted, but Derrida outlines a distinction between 
the ghost (the ​revenant ​or ​arrivant)​ and the spectre or phantom: 
 
‘The specter is first and foremost something visible. It is of the visible, but of the invisible 
visible, it is the visibility of a body which is not present in flesh and blood. It resists the 
intuition to which it presents itself, it is not tangible [...] And what happens with 
spectrality, with phantomality - and not necessarily with coming-back [revenance] - is 
that something becomes almost visible which is visible only insofar as it is not visible in 
flesh and blood’.  93
 
This distinction is not exhaustive in the sense of tying down or closing off. In keeping with 
Derrida’s open approach to concepts and their signifiers, the terms overlap and are therefore 
still in essence interchangeable. However, this is not to say that the distinction is arbitrary. It 
finds its roots in the spectral turn; the refiguration of the ghost from its prior, more general use in 
common parlance to a ‘conceptual metaphor [...] evoking, through a dynamic comparative 
interaction, not just another thing, word or idea and its associations, but a discourse, a system 
of producing knowledge’.   94
The ghost is not a pre-existing form in itself but the return of that which no longer is, the 
arrival of which then opens the lived moment of its partial appearance to a promissory future by 
way of the outside from whence it came. It is that which arrives (as ​arrivant, ​being beyond any 
sense of contemporaneity, a being to come) from outside. This is the absolute alterity of the 
body, the uncanny refusal of mortality. It is the figure most at home in the realms of the 
93 Derrida, Stiegler, ‘Spectrographies’ p.38 
94 Bal, cited in Pilar Blanco and Peeren, ‘Introduction: Conceptualizing Spectralities’ p.1 
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supernatural, the thing that troubles the boundaries of life and death and presence and absence 
in the most complete sense; the return of the dead, the return of that which is no longer living, 
no longer present, no longer extant in the here-now. The spectre, however, as a conceptual 
metaphor, a term itself brought back from relative disuse into the critical discourse, introduces a 
way of looking at things (as something visible, of the visible), reconceiving spectrality as an 
analytical framework, a methodology in itself: ‘The specter, as its name indicates, is the 
frequency ​of a certain visibility. But the visibility of the invisible. And visibility, by its essence, is 
not seen, which is why it remains ​epekina tes ousias, ​beyond the phenomenon or beyond 
being’.  Ghosts are therefore a manifestation of this spectral frequency, the return of that which 95
remains beyond the level of normal perception, the primordial conditions of the knowable or 
comprehensible. We find this effect in Barthes’ description of the absent presence of the 
photograph: ​‘The photo of the departed being comes to touch me like the delayed rays of a star. 
[...] [L]ight, though impalpable, is really a carnal medium here, a skin that I share with the one 
who was photographed.. The bygone thing has really touched, with its immediate radiations (its 
luminances), the surface that is in turn touched by my gaze’.  ​Derrida responds to this: 96
 
‘When Barthes grants such importance to touch in the photographic experience, it is 
insofar as the very thing one is deprived of, as much in spectrality as in the gaze which 
looks at images or watches film and television, is indeed tactile sensitivity. The desire to 
touch, the tactile effect or affect, is violently summoned by its very frustration, summoned 
to come back ​[appelé à-revenir], ​like a ghost ​[un revenant],​ in the places haunted by its 
absence’.  97
95 Derrida, ​Specters of Marx ​p.125 
96 Barthes, quoted in Derrida, Stiegler, ‘Spectrographies’, p.37 
97 Derrida, Stiegler, ibid. p.38 
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 We get a sense here that the abyss between presence and absence opened by the spectre, 
one that is without defined coordinates or perimeter - the spectral frequency itself, the 
boundless, oceanic, pre-originary context that escapes all material being, that flows without 
direction beyond it; the conditions for affirmative existence as dependent on a prior affirmation 
from a state of inaccessible alterity - is in fact a dimension (to use spatial language in futility, 
describing something essentially prelinguistic) to which we relate in a kind of desire, as well as 
in uneasiness or trepidation. The spectre, in both an intellectual sense (what we might call 
properly deconstructive), and in a more physical, practical sense (as in when we look at the 
photograph or the televisual image), resists all tangibility, all ‘intuition to present itself’.  98
Therefore the prelinguistic, prefigurative zone of the spectral abyss manifests as the desire for 
tangibility, the desire for closure in the face of a resounding openness, even a kind of seduction. 
As Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak writes in her preface to ​Of Grammatology: 
 
‘Deconstruction seems to offer a way out of the closure of knowledge. By inaugurating 
the open-ended indefiniteness of textuality - by thus “placing in the abyss”​ (mettre en 
abîme),​ as the French expression would literally have it, it shows us the lure of the abyss 
as freedom. The fall into the abyss of deconstruction inspires us with as much pleasure 
as fear. We are intoxicated with the prospect of never hitting bottom’.  99
 
Rather than demonstrating an irreconcilable inability to disclose the reality of the 
incommunicable (what we could perhaps here call the real), through the endlessness of 
98 Ibid. 
99 ​Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, in ​Derrida, ​Of Grammatology​ (MA: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997) 
p.lxxvii  
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differance we find that language in fact retains a promise of communicating that which lies 
outside its own organisation; that language demonstrates, at least partially, the ability to explain 
the impossible, to comprehend incomprehensibly, contains within it the possibility of a discourse 
of the end of the end: ‘what motivates deconstruction in its aporetic analysis of concepts is the 
relation which emerges in each case to something beyond. [...] it invents, in a variety of specific 
vocabularies tailored to fit the needs of a particular occasion, a series of descriptions of this 
‘beyond’.  In a hauntological manner, any instance of language functions through the 100
immanent retention of that which remains outside of it through the originary affirmation of the 
primordial abyss of this spectral frequency. The resistance of language to its own stratification 
as described by the process of differance, that the material sign, the symbol of exchange, 
retains a virtual potentiality opening to a beyond itself in the event of its instantiation, means that 
comprehending the extremity of the extreme manifests as a process of mourning. Here we can 
uncover the nature of Barthes’ desire for tactility: ‘It consists always in attempting to ontologize 
remains, to make them present, in the first place by identifying the bodily remains and by 
localizing the dead (all ontologization, all semanticization - philosophical, hermeneutical, or 
psychoanalytical - finds itself caught up in this work of mourning but, as such, it does not yet 
think it…’’.  When we are confronted with the ghost and the spectral frequency of differance it 101
reveals, in many ways all that one can​ ​do is ontologise. To conjure them away is to accept the 
material groundings between birth and death, to concede to the limits of knowledge as the limits 
of all possible existences. Therefore, to think mourning itself is to conceive a discourse of the 
end of the end; to recognise the anachronic contingency of the present and maintain, in an 
intellectual sense, an openness towards the no-longer or not-yet. It is this anarchic openness 
that is then reformulated in Derrida’s later work as the conditions for justice-to-come: ‘this 
100 Patton, ‘Future Politics’, p.25 
101 Derrida, ​Specters of Marx, ​p.9 
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capacity for writing in general to disinter, solicit, disturb, or disable becomes increasingly tied to 
an ethical vocabulary of futurity. Rather than the incalculable being presented as anarchy or 
chaos, it is now characterized as opening to a future’.  102
In speaking of a promissory justice as that which must remain suspended, always 
withheld from any given instance, it is useful to distinguish between the specific dynamics of the 
future through which this process occurs: ‘Derrida writes​ “l’à-venir”,​ which spaces out the 
ordinary word for the future, ​avenir,​ into the components of the infinitive: to come [...] in general 
one should remember that even in the ordinary translation as simply “future”, ​avenir ​has the 
sense of a coming, an advent’.  The future is therefore not conceived as a distance, as “across 103
the abyss” so to speak, something that remains always “over there” - an essentially passive 
notion - but something immanent, active; an excess that galvanises the present, projecting it 
forward through the living condition of experience. As Jean-Paul Martinon writes, in French 
there are in fact two words for “future”: ​l'avenir​ and ​le futur.​ The latter ‘relates to something 
distant’; it ‘implies the being of the future. [...] ​L’avenir,​ by contrast is something much closer - 
imminent, in fact - and is usually translated by futurity or what is “yet-to-come”. It is that which 
arrives...’.  However, Derrida uses a very specific term to describe the arrival, the 104
coming-back, of the spectre: ​“à-venir”.​ Martinon goes on: ‘By contrast, ​à-venir,​ “to-come” - here, 
futurity - represents - if it can represent anything at all - that which ​provokes, unhinges,​ or 
disjoints​ an event, and as such disturbs the very possibility of the event itself’.  ​À-venir​ does 105
not imply a yet-to-come but rather something that disturbs the event of arrival itself, of arrival as 
event, as a localised spatiotemporal phenomenon. It is unrelated to ​l’avenir ​as arrival - it cannot 
be translated to ‘advent’, a to-come, or ‘event’, as ‘characteri[sing] that which emerges or surges 
102 Colebrook, ‘Extinguishing Ability’, p.271 
103 Peggy Kamuf in Derrida, ​Specters of Marx, ​p.224 
104 Jean-Paul Martinon, ​On Futurity: Malabou Nancy & Derrida​ (London: Macmillan, 2007) p.3 
105 Ibid. p.5 
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out of that which comes’.  Therefore ​à-venir ​symbolises a spacing and temporisation outside 106
of any specific dimensional or chronological coordinates. It is founded on a cartography of the 
abyss, the space-time of the spectral frequency itself as dislocated from any defined sense of 
space or time as such: ‘with ​à-venir, ​nothing is measured, measurable, durational, spatial, or 
temporal’.  If through the hauntological method we are attempting to comprehend 107
incomprehensibly, the kind of framework that such a thought would require can be said to reside 
here, but without being confined to a specific point or position or taking on a discernible 
formation; residing without residing per se. It is the operative space-without-space of the 
spectral frequency, the continuous interruption and opening of established law to the promise of 
a future justice or democracy to-come; the revolutionary movement, that which allows for a 
transformative ethics of the other.  
Derrida explains this spectral frequency as it reaches into the world of lived reality 
through the ​‘visor effect’,​ taken from the image of Hamlet’s father’s helmet; the notion that ‘his 
[the ghost’s] gaze can see without being seen’.  To take the metaphor at surface level, we 108109
still perceive something in this situation: a Scooby-Doo esque suit of armour that obscures the 
carnal form of the body inside (if there is a body inside at all, that is). Yet the suit of armour is 
not the thing that is capable of looking at us. The key aspect of this state is that the gaze, a 
notion we generally associate with embodied perception, is decoupled from its spatial-temporal 
material grounding. In the context of Derrida’s proposition we find that embodiment in general - 
not simply an individual body, but the very notion of embodiment, the lived condition of the 
interior - cannot be considered a self-contained unit closed to the outside. It remains affected by 
that which cannot be conceived in its own terms. The spectral therefore manifests through a 
106 Ibid. p.4 
107 Ibid. 
108 Derrida, ​Specters of Marx, ​p.6 
109 Derrida, Stiegler, ‘Spectrographies’, p.41 
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kind of asymmetry: ‘It de-synchronizes, it recalls us to anachrony’.  If the ghosts appear to us 110
as the interruption of specularity, of the perceptual reflection of reality, they do so through the 
opening of its present conditions to a constitutive outside - this frequency of the spectral that we 
might call also the abyss of differance, the space-time of​ à-venir. ​Derrida says: ‘The specter is 
not simply this visible invisible that I can see, it is someone who watches or concerns me 
without any possible reciprocity, and who therefore makes the law when I am blind, blind by 
situation’.  Blindness - or, more accurately, what we could call a symptom of the process of 111
framing,​ the necessary exclusion that gives general perception the cohesive structure of 
representation - is the deciding factor in internal/external distinctions, the establishment of a 
frame of reference by which to measure existence as presence. 
Wood therefore sees in environmental destruction ‘a candidate for this status of ​arrivant. 
For it arrives ​as ​something that has been excluded, much as Freud describes the return of the 
repressed’.  In a similar vein, Ken Gelder and Jane M. Jacobs write, on the event of haunting 112
as a state of uncanny alterity: ‘This happens precisely at the moment when one is made aware 
that one has unfinished business with the past, at the moment when the past returns as an 
‘elemental’ force (and let us signal our interest in ghosts here through this word: ‘elemental’) to 
haunt the present day’.  “Elemental” invokes a sense of fundamentality, primordiality or 113
pre-originality, the de facto conditions for the event, while simultaneously, symbiotically, 
hauntologically, also invoking the play of weather systems, mineral substrates and the 
foundational chemicals from which all material reality is comprised. Again, it describes 
something irreducible. These conditions that are impinging on the present here-now from an 
110 Derrida, ​Specters of Marx, ​p.6 
111 Derrida, Stiegler, ‘Spectrographies’, p.41 
112 Wood, ‘Specters of Derrida: On the Way to Econstruction’ p.267 
113 Ken Gelder, Jane M. Jacobs, ‘The Postcolonial Ghost Story’ in ​Ghosts: Deconstruction, 
Psychoanalysis, History, ​p.181 
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anachronistic there-then are fundamental to the composition and structure of the event of the 
here-now itself. 
To give an example (one could in fact take almost any case of anthropogenic influence 
on Earth systems and observe a similar pattern), despite disagreement around the figures, it is 
basically universally accepted that the disruption of the carbon cycle as a result of human 
activity means the volume of atmospheric CO2 is increasing, and that this phenomenon is only 
accelerating with increasing industrial and agricultural development. Figures provided by the 
IPCC tell us that the time it takes to emit greenhouse gases is drastically shorter than the time it 
takes for that gas to be released (the equilibration of the atmospheric concentration of 
anthropogenic CO2) and according to its Fifth Assessment Report: ‘15 to 40% of CO2 emitted 
until 2100 will remain in the atmosphere longer than 1000 years’.  However these figures are 114
significantly different to others that have been put forward, disputing or confusing either the 
residence time​ (years) of atmospheric CO2 or the ​adjustment time ​(centuries to millennia) of 
specific changes in anthropogenic CO2 concentration.  We can perhaps read this 115116117118
variation as exposing the subject’s inherent politics, the apparent eagerness of certain 
researchers to downplay the scope and severity of anthropogenic climate change (see Peter 
Köhler et al.); however, the question here is not of any specific figure of residence or adjustment 
time per se, but the effects caused by CO2 retention within the bounds of an embodied human 
temporality. Of course, from an anthropocentric perspective thinking forward 1000 years into the 
114 Ciais P, Sabine C, Bala G et al. ‘Carbon and other biogeochemical cycles’ in: ​Climate Change 2013: 
The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change​. Stocker, ed. TF, Qin D, Plattner GK et al. (UK: Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2013) p.471 
115 ​Ari​ ​Halperin, ‘Simple Equation of Multi-Decadal Atmospheric Carbon Concentration Change’, 
defyccc.com ​(2018) (http://defyccc.com/se) 
116 http://euanmearns.com/the-residence-time-of-co2-in-the-atmosphere-is-33-years/ 
117 ​Hermann Hard​e, ‘Scrutinizing the carbon cycle and CO2 residence time in the atmosphere’ in Global 
and Planetary Change, Volume 164, (2018), p.65 
118 Peter Koehler et al. ‘Comment on “Scrutinizing the carbon cycle and CO2 residence time in the 
atmosphere” by H. Harde’ in ​Global and Planetary Change​ (2017) p.1 
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future is, for the most part, inconceivable without a great deal of largely unsubstantiated 
speculation. We are therefore left with a delay between cause and effect that calls into question 
a timeframe that cannot be conceived in terms of lived temporality. Warming created through 
the greenhouse effect is latent, projected onto a future that cannot be accessed from any lived 
perspective, yet which will continue to exert influence over the future conditions of this 
perspective regardless of its current inconceivability. As Wood writes, ‘if we stopped all carbon 
emissions today, the atmosphere would continue to warm into the foreseeable future’.  If the 119
effects of warming are already being felt in varying degrees around the globe, then the severity 
of such instances is only going to increase - a future is promised along with the catastrophes it 
may bring. 
This idea of retention, like the uncomfortable idea of the bioaccumulation of plastic, 
pesticides or heavy metals in organisms through constant unavoidable ingestion of 
environmental toxins, couples the state of imbalance and waiting with a disorienting loss of 
control. Not only is the future bundled into the present but the past always remains, invisible, 
returning through the channels of measuring instruments: a build up of gases in the 
atmosphere, petrochemicals in the ocean or a pocket of mercury in the brain; a toxic remnant, 
revenant,​ returning, the by-product or waste from something long since used up, that served its 
purpose in the cycle of resource-exploitation. Not only are these discarded remnants excluded 
from the progression of the industrial modernisation they instigate - being literally buried, 
cremated or dumped into the sea - but the promise of their return also remains outside of this 
spatial-temporal order, meaning although the effects of their return are undoubtedly felt, their 
cause remains disjointed. 
119 Wood, ‘Specters of Derrida: On the Way to Econstruction’, p.270 
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Spectralisation signifies displacement, and in the case of greenhouse gas emissions 
(and again, we find numerous scenarios in which this also applies) we find a displacement of 
cause and effect resulting from the dispersal of factors along multiple asynchronous timescales. 
As a by-product of some long-completed process, something remains. Past actions return, 
arriving in the present, in a form and to an effect entirely outside of that in which they were 
originally created. They arrive withheld, suspended, and, to us beings of the here-now, without 
any localised precedence. Like the ghost that persuades Hamlet, manifesting as a simulacrum 
of his father; the alterity of the body, the interior materiality into which it returns as an immaterial 
externality, the by-products of past industrial, mechanical processes return as something far 
removed from the processes themselves. Clark describes this phenomenon through the concept 
of ​scale,​ writing: ‘One reason environmental issues are so difficult and fraught is that scale 
effects entail spectral agencies that present no easily identified target or simple object in 
empirical reality for politics or law’.   120
In furthering this concept, the problem of representation he terms ‘scale framing’, Clark 
adopts Braden R. Allenby and Daniel Sarewitz’s view that the complexity of modern industrial 
processes ‘neutralizes and even mocks our existing commitments to rationality, comprehension, 
and a meaningful link between action and consequence’.  Allenby and Sarewitz break this 121
down into three levels, each describing an increasingly complex system of events and relations. 
Level I systems are the most basic, calculable relations between cause and effect, that which 
we would call the embodied, lived boundaries of the here-now - the individual use of the car in 
an A to B journey, for example. Level II systems describe a set of more complex 
socio-technological relations, ‘infinitely less predictable’ than the independent factors of the 
120 Timothy Clark, ‘Scale a Force of Deconstruction’ in ​Eco-Deconstruction: Derrida and Environmental 
Philosophy, ​p.87 
121 Braden R. Allenby, Daniel Sarewitz, ​The Techno-Human Condition,​ quoted in Timothy Clark, 
Ecocriticism on the Edge, ​p.6 
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events themselves - the complications that arise once the individual use of the car is taken in a 
wider sociocultural context. These often present themselves through the interruption of Level I 
systems, recontextualising Level I events as ‘embedded in higher-level technical networks, 
systems of social and technical control, with additional complications in their own security and 
pricing systems, relations to the law, and so on’.  Level III therefore corresponds to an even 122
higher degree of complexity, a register by which relations described at Level II are now 
indiscernible by Level II standards: ‘a proliferation of emergent effects [that] has long exceeded 
the possibilities of human foresight and planning’.  Level III describes a state in which effect is 123
entirely displaced from cause, meaning our techniques of predictive modelling are rendered 
useless: where, ‘at a certain, indeterminate threshold, numerous human actions, insignificant in 
themselves [...] come together to form a new, imponderable physical event, altering the basic 
ecological cycles of the planet’.  As we can see, the increasing complexity of these systems is 124
accompanied by the increasing inability for humans to mitigate their potential problems. Once 
we reach a Level III system - with climate change being the Level III system par excellance - 
innumerable layers of cause and effect have built up over time to the point that any sense of 
control or even conceivable scope of the problems that Level III interruptions of Level I or II 
systems may generate is completely outside of our grasp. Scale effects require consideration of 
various contingencies that reach from our present moment, as we turn the keys in our car, 
board a plane or eat a burger, into the anachronic non-space of the ​à-venir​ to come - the 
disruption of the lived interior of the present by external future virtualities. We see the formal 
structure of differance reflected in this situation: ‘What seems to come from outside, are the 
cumulative consequences of our own actions’.  Therefore, in order to properly account for 125
122 Ibid. p.7 
123 Clark, Ibid. 
124 Ibid. p.72 
125 Wood, ‘Specters of Derrida: On the Way to Ecoconstruction’, p.267 
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these actions, we must confront this outside, an act that can only be achieved through the 
tympanisation of the metaphysical platforms from which we are able to do so.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
60 
TO LIVE WITH OTHERS 
 
I have already explained how a deconstructive ethics as responsibility towards the other can 
inform ecological thought, but it serves to mention that the idea of justice Derrida emphasises in 
hauntology - a justice derived from ‘[t]he relation to others’ - is closely linked with the thought of 
Emmanuel Levinas. His philosophy can be used to inform the kind of eco-deconstructive 
hauntological ethics I have attempted to lay out, founded on the key tenet of responsibility 
toward the other as such.  However, Levinas’s conception of the other is distinctly 126
anthropocentric - as regarding the ​autrui, ​the other person - and both Derrida and Deleuze 
diverge from Levinas’s relational ethics in ways that break from this closure. In fact, it is in their 
treatment of the fundamentality of our relations with otherness that one of the closest parallels 
between the two can be found, and their respective divergences from Levinas have great 
bearing on the ecological implications of alterity I am concerned with.  
Put simply, the importance of the other is central to Levinas’s critique of Western 
metaphysics. His work shifts from the perceived egoism and isolation of an ontology that 
reduces the Other into the same: that Western philosophy, through its ontological articulation of 
being, has historically suppressed the state of otherness. This tradition works by way of an 
implicit hierarchisation - that, for example, the other can only be realised in terms of the self. The 
self becomes the a priori condition for the existence of the other, and allows - necessitates, 
even - a relation with the other based on dominance, exploitation and violence. Levinas moves 
toward establishing ethics as a “first philosophy”, foregrounding the encounter with the Other as 
a fundamental condition of the existence of the knowing Self (rethinking the Greek metaphysical 
tradition from which, for example, Husserlian phenomenology or Heideggarian ontology is, in 
126 Emmanuel Levinas, quoted in Derrida, ​Specters of Marx, ​p.26 
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ways unique to each, developed). Our ethical imperative is therefore to maintain otherness by 
resisting its projectivistic refiguration as per ontological tradition, since the Self is found only as 
infinitely obliged to the Other, the transcendent Good. 
For Levinas, the dimension of infinity that occupies the Other encountered in the 
face-to-face relation with the enclosed totality of the Self remains, from within, entirely outside 
the realms of comprehension. This throws an ontology of Sameness (the introduction of a 
unifying term that subsumes the Other and the Self, thereby neglecting the absolute alterity of 
the Other - having the mutual identity of “being”, for example) into question. However, as 
Derrida points out in ​Violence and Metaphysics, ​the absoluteness of the Other presents a 
paradox. He asks: ‘How to think the other, if the other can be spoken only as exteriority and 
through exteriority, that is, nonalterity?’.  Alterity is necessarily relational, meaning the Other 127
cannot in fact exist as an absolute. Once it is encountered, rendered in language, given the 
name “other”, its exteriority collapses as it is absorbed into the interiority of discourse. Ontology 
is violence, but speech, as the condition for this encounter, is violence also. As Derrida writes: 
‘The distinction between discourse and violence always will be an inaccessible horizon. 
Nonviolence would be the telos, and not the essence of discourse’.  Violence is therefore 128
intrinsically tied with a justice toward the other founded in discourse, in that to render the other 
in language necessarily excludes the state of otherness as such. Levinas’s fundamental ethics 
is dependent on an immediate, concrete encounter wherein the Other is revealed through 
speech, yet absolute alterity must be figured as something prelinguistic, the primordial 
inscription from which the experience of knowing is first derived. Therefore the otherness of the 
other can only be maintained through its differance, its suspension, the opening of concrete 
experience beyond itself. Indeed, this means the very notion of an infinite is problematised. The 
127 Derrida, ‘Violence and Metaphysics’ in ​Writing and Difference, ​p.145 
128 Ibid. p.145 
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Other cannot be absolute, since the conditions for its existence as such rely on the differance of 
the same, and likewise, the Same cannot exist as a totality, since it is always determined by, 
and therefore contains, in its exclusion, the other. This means there is always more than one 
beyond the infinite contained in the ​autrui, ​that the Other can never manifest as such, but only 
as a trace, an ​arrivant​. With this in mind, Davis identifies the Derridean spectre as ‘occup[ying] 
the place of the Levinasian Other’, again emphasising the ethical dimension of hauntology as a 
more-than-present refiguration of ontology. Only in this case, the ethical system is not 
dependent on the transcendent Good of the Other, but the immanence of radical alterity 
opening the present to the promissory future of a justice-to-come.  
Despite the undeniability of Levinasian echoes, hauntology lets us glimpse that which is 
presupposed in Levinas’s fundamental ethics, that the separation of Self and Other realised in 
discourse is still dependent on the originary violence of differance that structures all experience. 
To experience nonviolently is to experience nothing at all, and it is only in tension that ecological 
existence and an ethical system thus attuned can emerge: suspended, continuously 
reconfigured from its instance and therefore oriented as close as can be to the possibility of 
nonviolence inscribed in any given scope of experience. 
Further developing the ecological nature of this relation, we can draw a line by which the 
spectre, like the other described by Deleuze in ​Logic of Sense,​ ‘is not reducible to either an 
alternative subject or particular object, but is rather that which announces the structure that 
makes possible a coherent account of the world’.  This intimacy with the Other is explained by 129
Deleuze:  
 
129 Grant ​Hamilton, ‘The Man Without Others: Deleuze’s Structure-Other’ in ​IAFOR Journal of Ethics, 
Religion & Philosophy​ (2003) p.11 
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‘The Other assures the margins and transitions in the world [...] Others, from my point of 
view, introduce the sign of the unseen in what I do see, making me grasp what I do not 
perceive as what is perceptible to an Other. In all these respects, my desire passes 
through Others, and through Others it receives an object’.  130
 
The responsibility towards the Other we see in Levinas is refigured as immanent to the very 
structures of perception: ‘the Other makes manifest a structure, one that describes a triadic 
relation-function of subject to object, and in so doing ensures a coherency to the world for the 
fact that it guarantees the existence of those dimensions that are forever unseen to the 
observer. In a very real sense, then, the Other “completes” our perception of the world’.  The 131
other is preserved as ‘neither an object in the field of my perception nor a subject who perceives 
me: the Other is initially a structure of the perceptual field, without which the entire field could 
not function as it does’.  As we have seen, this notion of a frequency of perception outside the 132
realms of synchronised space-time interiority is a key aspect of Derrida’s spectrality: the 
invisible structure of visibility itself, the immanence of alterity that motivates differance. However, 
to conflate the two projects in a way that reads one through the other is erroneous. Rather, I 
want to draw a productive line of flight between the two thinkers in the hope of illuminating 
aspects of the projects of each as they relate to the precarious ecologies of the Anthropocene. 
Daniel W. Smith notes that, following Giorgio Agamben’s identification of the 
reinterpretation of Heidegger’s fundamental ontology as the crux of the two thinkers’ divergence, 
‘Deleuze attempts to develop an immanent ontology, while Derrida’s deconstruction necessarily 
130 Gilles Deleuze, ​Logic of Sense ​(London, Bloomsbury, 2015) p.314 
131 Grant Hamilton, ‘The Man Without Others: Deleuze’s Structure-Other’, p.14 
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64 
operates on the basis of a formal structure of transcendence’.  Of course, one of the primary 133
differences between the philosophical projects of Derrida and Deleuze is their relationship to 
philosophy itself, namely towards the practice of metaphysics. As I have said, Derrida, following 
Heidegger’s proclamation of “overcoming metaphysics”, attempts to disrupt the closure of 
traditional metaphysics - the metaphysics of presence - through the method of deconstruction: 
‘Immanent within metaphysics, there lies a formal structure of transcendence that can never be 
made present as such, but that nonetheless functions as the condition (the 
“quasi-transcendental” condition) of metaphysics itself’.  To think this transcendent 134
non-presence within a metaphysics of presence ‘constantly disrupts and “destabilises” 
metaphysics’ through reading the ‘the regulated play of philosophemes’ as ‘symptoms of 
something that ​could not be presented​ in the history of philosophy’.  It is the same sense of 135
quasi-transcendence that forms the spectral trace. It is of the other, the beyond, the externality 
immanent to any interior. This is how Derrida understands the emanation of the referent Barthes 
describes upon viewing the photo: ‘This Thing is the other insofar as it was already there - 
before me - ahead of me, beating me to it, I who am before it, I who am because of owing to it’.
 This perspective is transcendent in that it is founded on moving beyond the immanent 136
conditions of the present, yet the fact that this extraneous, futural dimension is not an a priori 
determinant but a fundamental component of these immanent conditions means we cannot call 
the spectre a transcendental entity in the proper sense, an ideal from which the event of being is 
then derived. Rather, the ghost manifests through a kind of transcendence in immanence, a 
133 Daniel W. Smith, ‘Deleuze and Derrida, Immanence and Transcendence’ in ​Between Deleuze and 
Derrida, ​p.48 
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136 Derrida, Stiegler, ‘Spectrographies’, p.42 
65 
motion that is revealed most jarringly in the anachronic system of death and the referent, but 
that in fact, again, gives structure to phenomenal experience itself. All experience is spectral. 
As I have said, in that it is already understood outside of the Derridean context the ghost 
is the perfect metaphor to mobilise in critiquing the metaphysics of presence. As a concept that 
has travelled from outside of philosophy, when it is applied in the field it both subtends and 
agitates the lines of thought to which it is added, opening these boundaries through the network 
of trace meanings and inferences it introduces. If the multiplicities revealed through the 
deconstructive technique are teased out by uncovering the aporias in frameworks of knowledge 
or perception, that which we uncover must necessarily remain inaccessible to us from inside the 
frameworks we are working to interrupt. The point of deconstruction is to reveal openings and 
discontinuities by communicating with the spectral frequency of semantic impossibility. 
Deleuze’s philosophy of immanence, however, rather than working from the margins of 
philosophy with a view to interrupt its constraints, to tympanise, to trouble and disturb its 
boundaries, operates strictly inside the bounds of metaphysics. He is, as he described himself, 
a ‘pure metaphysician’: ‘If one is critical of traditional metaphysics, [...] then the philosophical 
task is not to attempt to ‘overcome’ metaphysics, but rather to actively construct a ​different 
metaphysics’.  Rather than formulating a methodology based around escaping the confines 137138
of a closed, constrictive metaphysical system, Deleuze creates a new system, a new structure 
that remains fundamentally open, thereby resisting the trappings of the tradition of Western 
philosophy that Derrida seeks to interrupt from within. Smith sums this methodological 
difference up as such: ‘Put crudely, then, if Derrida sets out to undo metaphysics, Deleuze sets 
out simply to ​do ​metaphysics’.  With this in mind, we can begin to formulate an approach for 139
137 Ibid. p.49 
138 Ibid. pp.49-50 
139 Ibid. p.50 
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thinking not only ​through ​the aporia of the Anthropocene, but ​with ​it, and crucially, at the same 
time, ​beyond ​it. The kind of dual motion required in a deconstruction can, in an ecological 
sense, in fact accommodate these divergent approaches to metaphysics. I negotiate this 
through the methodology of the eco-, a necessary thinking together rather than a thinking 
against or apart: to think ecologically as in becoming-together, avoiding synthesis or closure and 
remaining open to flight and the fluidity of contextualisation via the ethico-hauntology of mutual 
responsibility from which these relations emerge. 
One of the key factors in this approach is the realisation of the terrestrial assemblage in 
not only describing the entanglement of heterogeneous agencies but in understanding the 
dynamics of the systems themselves. This would involve a break with the idea of the system as 
a closed network of information exchange, instead emphasising openness and dynamism in 
constantly shifting structures of connectivity. The fluidity and instability of assemblages results 
from the movement of particular components along vectors of deterritorialisation. If we take the 
assemblage of an ecosystem for example, climate change as an ongoing geophysical 
phenomenon operates as this deterritorialising element. It induces reconfiguration of other parts, 
thereby providing the assemblage with its necessary temporality based on an entropic 
disorganisation and eventual dissolution. This means it is distinguishable and measurable ​as 
these alterations, its arrival manifested as a deterritorialisation - the displacement and 
reformulation of the ecosystem’s components. The bleaching of a coral reef due to rising ocean 
temperatures involves the displacement of the algae that lives symbiotically in its tissue: the 
interruption of a territorialisation, the formation of connections that maintain the status quo 
identity of the assemblage. The coral may find new occupants more suited to these 
environmental stressors or may remain empty and die, but either way, changes in connectivity; 
disorganisation and reconfiguration, have occurred as a result of the deterritorialising force of a 
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particular component, transforming the structure. Anthropogenic activities such as deforestation 
have the same deterritorialising effect, as do geophysical phenomena like volcanic eruptions or 
tsunamis. However the assemblages formed in the Anthropocene are characterised by a distinct 
kind of deterritorialising element: one that does not run concurrent with the processes of 
evolutionary mutation or geophysical phenomena preordained by natural law (although I deploy 
this term cautiously), but that can be explicitly tied to human activity, therefore presenting an 
ethical injunction. 
Since assemblages are comprised of actual and virtual entities, Deleuze and Guattari 
distinguish between “relative” and “actual” deterritorialisation, where relative deterritorialisation 
describes the reconfigurations of the actual and absolute deterritorialisation describes 
reconfigurations of the virtual. Paul Patton writes: ‘In itself, absolute deterritorialisation remains 
an unrealisable or impossible figure, manifest only in and through relative deterritorialisation, 
meaning relative deterritorialisation only occurs because there is ‘a perpetual immanence of 
absolute deterritorialization within relative deterritorialization’.  We can therefore see that 140
deterritorialisation works through the same promissory futural dimension as the differance of 
justice, the openness of the to-come, with actual deterritorialisation occupying the unrealisable, 
impossible horizon of the destabilised spacing and temporisation of ​à-venir: 
 
‘Absolute deterritorialisation is the underlying principle which ensures that the future will 
be different from the past, or that the future must be understood as inhabited by the 
permanent possibility of otherness or monstrosity. In political terms, absolute 
deterritorialisation is manifest as revolution or the minor forms of becoming-revolutionary 
140 Patton, Deleuze, Guattari, ibid. p.22 
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which are not to be confused with the past, present or future of actual revolutions, but 
which nonetheless call for new earths and new peoples’.  141
 
In a similar vein, the anachrony of the spectral frequency and its promise of a democracy to 
come is identified by Derrida as the energy of revolution: ‘As soon as one calls for the 
disappearance of ghosts, one deprives oneself of the very thing that constitutes the 
revolutionary movement itself, that is to say, the appeal to justice [...] which must carry beyond 
the synchrony of living presents’.  For example, systems of law manifest in an ongoing and 142
open process of oscillation between deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation, always oriented to 
a futural dimension. It is exactly this kind of transformative revolutionary movement, one that 
takes place beyond institutional or governmental arrangements, that ecological matters are 
concerned with, since it is through this horizon of the to-come that we can begin to comprehend 
the context - in a very literal, environmental sense, the environment as the conditions for 
existence itself - from which these systems emerge. To think ecologically is to question any 
ideal of the predetermined, static, closed, ​non-living ​system of thought - one that does not 
account for the multiplicity, dynamism and inherent violence of the natural world from which it 
arises. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
141 Ibid. pp.25-26 
142 Derrida, Stiegler, ‘Spectrographies’ pp.45-46  
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 THE MANY ANTHROPOCENES 
 
As it has spread throughout the collective consciousness, any form capable of critique will, 
when engaging with the Anthropocene, at some point find as its foundation a condition of 
interconnectedness, entanglement - the ‘inescapability of relations’.  Questions of multiplicity 143
abound, and this structure is typical not only of the various spatiotemporalities of the 
Anthropocene and the coordination of the entities and objects existing therein, but reveals the 
counterintuitive, multifactorial nature of the concept itself. The Anthropocene, as an epoch 
characterised by the immediate foregrounding of various kinds of entanglement, is itself 
composed of entanglements, of openings and deferrals, meaning a holistic approach will only 
serve to obscure the interplay of its contexts and strata. Zalasiewicz writes: ‘there are many 
Anthropocenes out there, used for different purposes along different lines of logic in different 
disciplines’, but, as we know, any one of these Anthropocenes cannot be invoked entirely in 
isolation.  The relational structure of the concept means that to think it effectively is to 144
reconcile various divergent spatiotemporal scales, to counterbalance multiple, often 
contradictory narratives with a view to allow for an articulation of the human that remains open 
to the depth of its ecological interconnections. 
This distribution is not necessarily a question of adoption, that the term is operative in 
one methodological system, then stripped of these operations as it is transposed onto another, 
different system (as in the adoption of object oriented ontology from computer science for 
example), but that the concept as an object of study actually operates ​through ​its own entirely 
143 ​Ben Dibley, ‘The Shape Of Things To Come’: Seven Theses On The Anthropocene And Attachment’ in 
Australian Humanities Review, 52​ (2012) p.148 
144 Quoted in Dipesh Chakrabarty, ‘Anthropocene Time’ in ​History & Theory, 57, 1 ​(2018) p.5 
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indisciplined multiplication. Again, there is always more than one of them: to think the 
Anthropocene in one field is to at once summon a network of functional registers that remain 
suspended from any given, immediate application, yet through which this application is itself 
actualised. While it can of course - with a view to criticise any potential obfuscation, being as it 
is a central point of contention in a very severe and urgent situation - be argued that as the term 
has proliferated it has only become distorted and reformulated by the distinct methodologies of 
various fields to the degree that any two given definitions may share little common ground, it 
remains that this sense of auto-dispersal; that the Anthropocene cannot be thought at the kind 
of transdisciplinary frequency it seems to naturally reside without being broken into various 
antithetical sub-narratives, deterritorialising itself, so to speak, presents a situation in which the 
compossibility or ‘inclusive disjunction’ of its strata - the Anthropocene as ​‘both ​yet one more 
way of understanding the whole existing alongside any others, ​and ​a way of organising and 
subsuming all others’ - is not an inconvenient byproduct of over-analysis but an implicit function 
of the concept.  One could say that due to its existence as such, it is impossible to distort 145146
the Anthropocene to the point of obscuration since it is, taken in present, ontological frames of 
understanding, already obscured by the palimpsestic nature of its manifestation in discourse.  
Although wary of making an argument specifically for or against the use of the 
Anthropocene over the many other -cenes generated in its wake, in keeping with Colebrook I 
want to follow her use of the Anthropocene in an essentially stratigraphic sense as per Deleuze 
and Guattari: ‘to intensify the geological stratification that opens the thought of the 
Anthropocene’.  For now, the term Anthropocene is useful precisely as a result of its self 147
145 ​T Toivanen et al. ‘The Many Anthropocenes: A Transdisciplinary Challenge For The Anthropocene 
Research’ in ​The Anthropocene Review, 4, 3 ​(2017) 
146 Claire Colebrook, ‘‘A Grandiose Time of Coexistence’: Stratigraphy of the Anthropocene’ in ​Deleuze 
Studies 10.4 ​(2016) p.442 
147 Ibid. 
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problematisation, and of course, to deploy the term in a stratigraphic sense summons its own 
groundlessness as a geochronological superimposition with the histories preserved in Holocene 
strata - the past interrupting the present by opening it to a promissory future. Through 
generating narratives that trouble any sense of linear scope or boundaries, rather than 
cementing the figure of an Anthropos and the kind of univocal history it implies, the inclusive 
disjunction of the concept’s own stratifications can provide ways of thinking these multiple 
narratives together, so long as resistance to the possibility of one incorporating all others 
through reterritorialisation can be maintained. This approach has a deconstructive inflection, 
with the asymmetry of the inclusive disjunction bearing a distinctly spectral character. It is the 
logic through which a relation with the other as other can be maintained, a productive 
connection that does not require its terms to share any sense of cohesion in themselves due to 
the suspended possibility of a cohesion to come. It therefore describes an encounter with the 
other without closure or assimilation, crossing the gap without any mediating commonality, an 
irreducible relation that occurs through maintaining difference rather than synthesising its factors 
into a homogenous unity. 
As just one example of the multidimensional arrangement of these narratives, Ben 
Dibley sets out seven theses of the Anthropocene, each of which falls under or extends into an 
otherwise separate methodology or disciplinary plateau: (1) ​‘as epoch and as discourse’, ​the 
recognition of humanity as a geo-biological force altering the composition of the environment.  148
(2) as ​‘the crease of time ​[...] the appellation for the folding of radically different temporal scales’.
 (3) as ​‘oppos[ing] freedom’, ​countering the emancipatory politics of modernity, ‘posit[ing] 149
absolute limits to human activity, curtailing the sphere of human freedom’.  (4) as ​‘nostalgia for 150
148 Ben Dibley, ‘‘The Shape of Things to Come’: Seven Theses on the Anthropocene and Attachment’, 
p.139 
149 Ibid.140 
150 Ibid.141 
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the human’, ​eradicating the possibility of any distinction between nature and society, yet 
remaining nostalgic for this distinction.  (5) as ​‘hail[ing] Earthlings’, ​rejecting humanity's 151
‘omnipresent mastery’ over other species.  (6) as ​‘an emerging apparatus’, ​introducing new 152
ways of conceptualising Earth as a complex bio-geo-chemical system.  And (7) as having ​‘no 153
future’, ​but instead ​‘prospects’:​ a rejection of the narratives of futurity and progress upon which 
the onto-political model of modernity rests.  While the contents and scope of a list such as this 154
is by no means exhaustive, we can see from just this single and relatively early (2011) study the 
network of problem-discipline relations the concept introduces. Now, while divisions of interest 
between the natural sciences and humanities is obvious for example, it remains that, as these 
narratives are generated, stratified along disciplinary plateaus, if we are to consider the 
Anthropocene as a concept coexisting within various chronologies - perceived through a 
particular observational apparatus, part of a particular ecology of ideas - we find these 
stratifications already open to deterritorialisation, already reaching beyond themselves and 
already interrupted by the spectral intrusions of others, disrupting their boundaries and therefore 
inciting the production of novel vocabularies, methodologies and narratives. The key to thinking 
these properly, however, is to maintain the differences of each without resorting to 
hierarchisation and univocality.  
The Anthropocene can therefore be envisioned as ‘a rush of stories’, as Anna Tsing 
writes in ​The Mushroom at the End of the World:  
 
‘A rush of stories cannot be neatly summed up. Its scales do not nest neatly; they draw 
attention to interrupting geographies and tempos. These interruptions elicit more stories 
151 Ibid.142 
152 Ibid.144 
153 Ibid.145 
154 Ibid.147 
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[...] it is just these interruptions that step out of the bounds of most modern science, 
which demands the possibility for infinite expansion without changing the research 
framework’.  155
 
At both the macro and micro level, scale is one of the Anthropocene’s central problems. We are 
at once faced with the irreconcilability of human-level and Earth-level spatiotemporalities, the 
timescale of the individual against and within the timescale of the planet, where the ‘deep time 
of geology’ and the ‘rather shorter history of capital’ must be thought simultaneously.  As I 156
have said, the Anthropocene as a concept applied in any one field is always haunted by its 
application in others. It remains partially withdrawn, not all there, and scalability is the crux of 
this tension of distribution. However, we cannot take Tsing’s argument and claim a reformulation 
that would allow the concept to be exchanged freely, to scale endlessly (therefore exorcising 
any tendencies towards spectralisation) would be in any way less troublesome. In fact, this 
would run counter to the kind of multivalent thinking the problem demands by developing 
through overcoding rather than differential, ecological multiplicity. If the Anthropocene marks an 
interruption in the temporality of modernity as marked by progressive, vertical development, the 
Anthropocene’s unscalability, its counterintuitiveness and inherent transdisciplinarity, in fact 
manifests as something horizontal, fragmentary and multidirectional, thereby directly countering 
modernistic thought. Tsing defines scalability as ‘a hallmark of modern knowledge [...] the ability 
of a project to change scales smoothly without any change in project frames’.  The disjunction 157
of the Anthropocene concept signals that something has become unhinged, always been 
unhinged, with the history of modernity around which these various narrative temporalities 
155 Anna Tsing, ​The Mushroom at the End of the World ​(NJ: Princeton University Press, 2015) p.37 
156 Dibley, ‘‘The Shape of Things to Come’: Seven Theses on the Anthropocene and Attachment’, p.140 
157 Tsing, ​The Mushroom at the End of the World, ​p.38 
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coalesce. In a sense we can see the figure of a unified Anthropos paralleled in this singular 
articulation of a history determined by progress and modernisation. Scalability as a function of 
the concept is central to the development of knowledge within modernity’s arborescent model of 
history, but since this unified anthropos is in actual fact nowhere to be found, the Anthropocene 
does not fit with this model. If the thrust of modernity is displaced as the primary temporal mode 
we can perceive without speculative ventures into more-than-human timescales, history in the 
Anthropocene becomes, as Tsing writes, ‘indeterminate and multidirectional’.  Tsing sees the 158
‘contaminated diversity’ of assemblages as a way to approach the dual problems of scalability 
and historicity, contrasting the production model of colonial European sugarcane plantations - 
‘an inspiration for later industrialisation and modernisation’, enabling the passage of time 
through a sense of vertical progress - with the system of ‘transformative relations’ that 
constitutes the matsutake mushroom forest, a horizontal temporality motivated by the ongoing 
process of reconfiguration through deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation.  Matsutake 159
require a specific arrangement of other flora in order to grow, and complex relational structures 
such as these cannot be translated to the scalable model of the plantation meaning it is 
impossible for humans to cultivate them. Systems such as the matsutake forest are 
non-scalable because their elements are constituted by way of their relations: ‘assemblages 
don’t just gather lifeways; they make them’.  However, if time in the Anthropocene becomes 160
multidirectional and indeterminate - anachronistic, in other words - in a deconstructive sense 
this would entail the breaking down of the very idea of narrative itself. If narrative is determined 
through an originary foundation, a sequential orientation in terms of which it is determined - the 
birth-death of the individual, for example, where the sense of narrative is derived from the 
158 Ibid. p.23 
159 Ibid. p.40 
160 Ibid. p.23 
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temporality of lived experience - then we are forced to reconcile with the relational context that 
determines this foundation as such, thereby destabilising its self-identical boundaries. How to 
think narrative in a time without narrative? Simply abandoning any concept of cohesion is of 
course not useful, yet as I have said the solution to this does not rest on thinking by way of 
constriction and closure, by determining narratives through self-identification. Rather, to 
conceptualise narratives through differential relationality, so that each determines the other, 
retaining their own agencies through the maintenance of these relations, means that we can 
hold such ideas to task without sacrificing the modes of existence they describe. It is not so 
much that “narratives” no longer exist, it is just that they manifest in fluidity, tension and 
multitude, meaning we must attend to an intellectual framework that allows us to think them as 
such. 
The concept of the Anthropocene occupies both a position of generalisation and 
differentiation. Like capitalism, it ‘determines the conditions and possibility of its own universal 
history’ - the history of species-man ​- ​but only ‘insofar as [it] has to deal essentially with its own 
limit, its own destruction’ - through the proliferation of sub or counter narratives (capitalocene, 
plantationocene, chthulucene, etc.).  The inclusive disjunction Colebrook employs here is ‘a 161
way of thinking about ​intensifying ​the tendency of the Anthropocene, and to move from its 
reterritorialisation (the creation of a unified humanity, even if only some were responsible), to a 
higher deterritorialisation’.  This deterritorialisation is achieved through the geological 162
stratification that allows us to envisage temporalities beyond our own, while ‘resist[ing] the 
re​territorialisation that would allow this stratification to co-opt all others’.  Thinking the 163
Anthropocene in this way, as something simultaneously organised and organising, always open 
161 Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, quoted in Colebrook, ‘‘A Grandiose Time of Coexistence’, p.441 
162 Ibid. p.442 
163 Ibid. 
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to alteration, gives us a framework through which to comprehend its inherent aporia. So again, 
this move can be understood as a deconstructive one: like the twofold action of the spectre, 
both signifying and enacting the spectral openness of differance, to think the Anthropocene in a 
stratigraphic sense grants the concept the kind of openness that is needed to accommodate the 
multivalent, contradictory lines of thought that our current ecological situation demands. Our 
ethical imperative is to comprehend our entangled state in a way that does justice to it as such, 
maintaining it in its trace, hauntological relativity so as not to delude or damage our 
multi-species relations by implementing an exclusionary metaphysical framework; allowing for 
the constant remodelling of the law of the present based on the endless deferral of a justice to 
come, the promissory future of a present that remains ‘always open, anarchic and therefore 
potentially open to a justice, democracy, friendship or hospitality that could not be constrained 
by the history of ‘humanity to date’’.   164
Of course, it serves to mention that maintaining a radical openness to possibility can 
invite some incredibly damaging modes of thinking and being-in-relation that are absolutely not 
conducive to ecological thought. However, this is where the responsibility to the other at the 
core of hauntological ethics comes into play. Maintaining openness to the generative potential of 
the to-come does not imply simply intensifying vectors of deterritorialisation so as to bring about 
radical change, since the inherent malignancy of these (almost universally anthropogenic) 
forces do not ultimately allow for all divergent modes of present existence to continue within a 
spatial or temporal scale of their own. Forms of existence that can be maintained under such 
conditions are swept up, transforming and proliferating, while all others are eliminated. A good 
example here would be again to compare the sustainable ecological deterritorialisations of 
evolution with the virulent, deleterious deterritorialisations of anthropogenic climate change. 
164 Claire Colebrook, ‘Anti-Catastrophic Time’ in ​New Formations, 92 ​(2017) p​.114 
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Both function through destabilisation of that which currently exists, a constant moving towards 
alterity, but the latter is not conducive to multiple lifeways, instead maintaining its own velocity 
through their exploitation and erasure. New modes of existence are produced, but only through 
the sacrifice of all others. Although I have spoken about the need for a metaphysical system that 
resists closure in favour of productive openness, Clark makes a point that helps to ground the 
potentially harmful deterritorialising forces that can arise from these conditions: that we find, 
when considering a problem such as climate change, we are actually presented with a very 
defined and absolute “limit” in the finite resources of the Earth itself. I have already mentioned 
the method of “thinking ecologically”. This shares with deconstruction a sense of fundamental 
openness to change, even through tension, based on the co-existence of various organisms, 
ideas and spatiotemporalities along multiple vectors of destabilisation and reconfiguration. This 
limit is one informed by a living condition, a realisation of the other through boundless 
multidirectional evolution, a horizontal development through ever-increasing complexity. A 
mutating, living, non-stationary limit - an evolving limit, one that remains fundamentally open, 
reaching beyond itself through its own constant deterritorialisation - a deterritorialisation 
facilitating the multiple lifeways that comprise the biosphere. 
If we take Haraway’s incentive to make the Anthropocene as short/thin as possible, if we 
resist the temptation to overcode, maintaining the distinct lineages of its various dimensions and 
keeping them open to alteration, then the concept’s transdisciplinary, generative potential 
manifests in the same way. As such, a concept that is in some respects emblematic of the worst 
modernistic tendencies, of conceding to myths of human mastery over a subordinate natural 
world, in fact runs counter to the vertical, arboreal nature of a modernistic thought based on an 
ongoing process of synthesis and elimination. Additionally, if we accept the implications of a 
hauntological ethics, to do justice to the other as other, accepting responsibility for the other as 
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the inaccessible structural determinant of all present, anthropocentric experience, then we, as 
Colebrook writes, would ‘act and think as if our world and our time were one among others’.  165
Calls to a more-than-human thought are not calls to abandon the human perspective entirely, 
for it is now that the human perspective is more valuable than ever. However, it is also the point 
at which we must understand this human perspective ​as ​a limit, a closure, something to which 
the constitutive outside will always remain inaccessible. For example, the imperialist mission to 
terraform Mars (to us, through the lenses of our rovers, a blank non-place primed for 
anthropogenic colonialism - a home for the Anthropos, perhaps?) with the hope of escaping any 
potential of an uninhabitable Earth is simply another refusal to accept this limit, that there is 
nothing beyond the vertical, here-now progression of anthropocentric modernity; another effort 
to escape the determining non-presence of the inaccessible other at the heart of our terrestrial 
existence. It is therefore the point at which the human perspective can open itself up as one 
world among others; worlds with divergent and unthinkable ways of existence, ensuring that we 
are not only open to ​the​ future, ​our ​future, but multiple futures, both human and 
more-than-human.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
165 Colebrook, ‘Stratigraphy for the Anthropocene’, p.453 
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